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ABSTRACT 
The study reports on the applicability of competing 
models of market information integration and dissemination in 
explaining the behavior of simple laboratory, one-period security 
markets. Returns to the security depended upon a randomly chosen 
state of nature.  Some agents ( insiders), whose identity was unknown 
to o ther agents , knew the state before the markets opened . With 
replication of market conditions a model based upon rational 
expec tations principles is relatively accurate.  Prices adjusted 
immediately to near rational expectations prices ; profits of  
insiders were virtually indistinguishable from noninsiders;  and 
efficiency levels converged to near 100 percent.
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about the returns are immediately reflected in market price. Thus , 
according to these models ,  prices adjust instantaneously to equilibrium 
price levels which reflect at least "all available" information about 
the state of  nature and in the case of the "crystal ball" hypothesis 
the equilibrium may reflect even more information than the sum of what 
is available to individual participants . 
Differences among some models turn on the role played by 
price itself in conveying information about the state of nature.  
On one hand are rational expectations equilibria which adhere to the 
principle that prices in equilibrium must be consistent with the 
expectations individuals have about the state of nature when they 
face those prices . Thus , individuals infer the state of nature (up to 
a probability) from the price and that inference must be consistent 
with their experience and their own actions . On the o ther hand are the 
prior information equilibria which hold that individuals do no t condition 
expectations upon price. Instead , expectations are exogenous to the 
price formation process with individuals utilizing whatever prior 
information they might have at their disposal . With expectations 
formed , prices are determined by a s traightforward application of the 
principles o f  demand and supply . 
We cannot claim that we have " tested" any of these models . 
All models are accompanied by technical assumptions and qualifications 
which are no t present in the markets we created . Of course,  some of 
the technical assumptions are for "convenience" while o thers are "critical" 
but ,  prior to applying the model to an empirical contex t ,  it is impossible 
to determine how assumptions should be partitioned into the two categories . 
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Thus , we are attempting a less ambitious task of determining the 
relative applicability of the competing models within simple (relative 
to the U . S .  securities market) laboratory markets which have many 
of the features of  markets which motivated the development of  the 
models . It is our hope that by s tudying models which can be success­
fully applied to simple markets we can ascertain fea tures of models 
which will ultimately have successful applications to the complex 
markets. Furthermore, models which are being advocated as general , 
with the advocates prepared to relegate all the " technical" assumptions 
to the "as if" categories or the "convenience" categories , should be 
expected to work in the simple special cases such as our laboratory 
markets . 
In the sections below we report  on five markets . Our 
experimental design reflects both our initial expectations and what 
we learned after the first market experiment .  At first our expecta­
tions leaned in favor of the prior information equilibrium model as 
opposed to the rational expectations model . The results of the 
first experiment suggested that any market designed to discredit 
the rational expectations ideas must involve sufficient opportunity 
for experience . The second market was designed to give the 
rational expectations model a "best chance" relative to the prior 
information equilibria. The design of the second market was simplified
by giving agents experience with the system when all agents had 
complete information prior to the insider information cases and by
reducing the number of subjective states of nature as opposed to
objective states so that the necessary replication could take place
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within the available time. The rational expectations model performed 
well with prices and allocations converging close to the "perfectly 
informed" equilibrium. The next two markets involved replications 
without the experience with the certainty case ,  and the final market 
5 involved an increase in the number of states from two to three 
as a check on the model . I t  continued to predict well . 
The paper is developed as follows . In sect ion two the 
markets and parameters are discussed . In section three our hypotheses 
are stated clearly and in section four they are reviewed in light of 
the results . In section five some of the implications of the analysis 
are reviewed in light of current mathematical models and the statis tical 
models applied to the United S tates securities industry . The last 
section is a su111111ary of conclus ions . Details of experimental procedures 
which are the heart of the markets are outlined in Appendix A.  
II.  LABORATORY MARKETS 
Each market experiment involved several periods . In each 
period securities which had one-period lives were bought and sold . 
Each security paid a single dividend to the holder at the end of the 
period for which the security existed .  The dividend returns from 
security holdings differed across individuals (which could be analogous 
to different tax brackets or risk preferences) and depended upon the 
(randomly drawn) state of nature. Differences in dividends and possibly 
expectat ions led to the existence of gains from exchange and market 
1 activity. The markets were organized as oral double auctions s imilar
to those on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange.  
6 
Subjects were students at the Graduate School of Business at 
the University of Chicago . In markets 1 ,  2 , and 4 all subjects were 
inexperienced in that none had previously participated in a laboratory 
market. Subjects in markets 3 and 5 were experienced since they were 
drawn from the participants of the earlier market experiments . 
Individual preferences were created by an application of 
induced value theory (Smith 1976, and Plott 1979) . Each individual 
subject,  i ,  was assigned a dollar redemption function of the form: 
Rt i 
Rt i 
t xi 
di ( 9) 
I Pits s 
I pit
p p 
t \ it \ it t yi[ai + di ( St) xi +l Ps - l pp + Ci] , s p 
t ai < O, di( 9) > O, yi > 0, xi_:: 0. 
dollar earnings of individual i in period t .  
units held by i a t  the end o f  period t (all short sales 
were prohibited so xi _:: 0), is the sum of initial endowment
of securities plus purchases less sales in period t. 
dividend rate in francs for individual i and expressed as 
a func tion of the state of nature 9 .  
revenue from sales o f  securities during period t .  
cost o f  securities purchased during period t .  
e £ n = possible states of  nature. 
ct i 
ai 
initial endowment of cash in francs . 
fixed cos t in francs . 
yi = conversion rate of francs into dollars . 
As long as an individual has a positive utility for money , (s)he would 
t like Ri as large as is possible . This mot ivation sys tematically induces 
values on the securities by virtue of derived demand theory . Such values 
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can then be used as parameters on market models.  
As  is  implicit in  the formula above, at the beginning of each 
period each individual was given an initial endowment of working capital 
(C�) which was sufficiently large to never serve as a binding constraint
on purchases of securities. Each individual was also given an initial 
- t  endowment of securities (x i ) at the beginning of each period . S ince
short sales were never permitted except as a reduction of an individual's 
, - t initial endowment,  there was a fixed supply of securities , lxi . i 
The initial endowment in the form of working capital and 
securities was frequently o f  substantial value.  Since these amounted 
to a payment to the individual each perio d ,  a f ixed cost each period, 
ai < O ,  was imposed to reduce the cost of the experiment .
All trading was in francs. Use o f  francs allows flexibility 
in the choice of parameters while avoiding the technical problems 
inherent in usin$ large levels of dollars, Francs have been successfully 
employed in o ther experiments (Friedman 1967; Forsythe , Palfrey, and 
Plott 1980) . 
A key variable in these market experiments is the pattern 
of information. Since dividends depend upon the state of nature,  
security prices should be influenced by what agents know about the 
state. In these markets some agents (the insiders) were informed 
about the state of nature before trading began while o thers ( termed 
"uninformed agents") were not. In market 1 insiders' knowledge about 
the state was less than certain while in markets 2 through 5 insiders 
were certain about the state. 
Information about the state of nature is termed prior information.
All individuals were aware of the mechanism for determining the state of 
nature.  In  the absence of further information the prior information 
was characterized by their knowledge of the state-generating process 
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which we will call prior probabilities for convenience ( the magnitudes are 
listed in Figure 1).2 
Prior information in addition to prior probabilities was 
given to some agents during some periods.  At the beginning of  each 
period a "clue card" was given to each agent. The card could be blank 
or it could contain a "clue . "  This mechanism allowed additional information 
about the state to be transferred privately to subsets of the agents 
before any trading took place. 
The case where all individuals had only their prior probabilities 
is called the "no information" case. As shown on Figure 1 the first 
few periods of every market ( the first four in 1, the first four in 2, 
the first two in 3 ,  the f irst four and the last in 4, and the first 
three in 5)  were conducted under the "no information" condition. 
This condition served as both a training period and a period of 
"calibration" for experimental purposes as will be discussed below. 
During a few periods of market 1 (periods 9, 10,  11) , 
market 2 (periods 5 ,  6) , and market 3 (periods 11 ,  12) all individuals 
were informed about the state. As shown on Figure 1, during these 
periods everyone had the same "clue" in market 1 and everyone knew 
the state with certainty in markets 2 and 3 .  These were included 
as checks and controls. In market 2 the case of  complete information 
was conducted in order to let agents learn about the price/state 
correspondence prior to their conducting operations in less informed 
environments.  After observing the results we suspected that this type 
of training was unnecessary for the successful application of rational 
Prior Knowledge 
Marke l Prob. about Others' 
No. of X Dividends 
l l/J Nore 
2 1/3 None 
Different 
3 0.4 investors may 1have d if f eren I 
dividends 
Different 
4 0.4 
investors may 
have different 
dividends 
Different "(X)•.35 
5 "(Y)•.25 investors may 
P(Z)•.4 have different 
dividends 
Number of 
Period Informed A�ents 
1 None 
2 None 
3 None 
4 None 
5 3-one of each type 
6 3-one of each type 
7 3-one of each type 
8 3-one of each type 
9 All 
10 All 
ll All 
l None 
2 None 
3 None 
4 None 
5 All 
6 All 
7 6-two of each type 
8 6-two of each type 
9 6-two of each type 
10 6-two of each type 
ll 6-twc of each type 
1 None 
2 None 
3 6-two of each type 
4 6-two of each type 
5 6-two of each type 
6 6-two of each type 
7 6-two of each type 
8 6-two of each type 
9 6-two of each type 
10 6-two of each type 
11 All 
12 All 
l None 
2 None 
3 None 
4 None 
5 6-two of each type 
6 6-two of each type 
7 6-two of each type 
8 6-two of each type 
9 6-two of each type 
10 6-two of each type 
11 n-two of each type 
12 6-two of each type 
13 6-two of each type 
14 None 
1 None 
2 None 
) None 
4 6-two of each type 
5 6-two of each type 
6 6-two of each type 
7 6-two of each type 
8 6-two of each type 
9 n-two of each type 
10 6-two of each type 
11 6-two of each type 
12 6-two of each type 
13 6-two of each type 
FIGURE l 
INFORMATION DESIGN 
Correla t ioo 
of Info. 
Precision of across 
Information Investors 
Perfect 
Imperfect Perfect 
(a sequence Perfect 
of ten Perfect 
clues) Perfect Perfect 
Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perteet Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Per feet 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Perfect Perfect 
Co11D11on Knowledge about 
Informed Agents 
How In��ed 
Many Who Know 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes (0) Yea 
No No Yea 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No N" Yea 
Yea Yea Identical 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yea 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yea 
No No Yea 
No No Yee 
No No Yea 
No No. Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yea 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yea 
No No Yes 
No No Yea 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yea 
No No y.,s 
No No Yes 
No No Y.,s 
No No Yes 
No No Y.,s 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
Yes(O) Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
No - No Yes 
No No Yes 
No No Yes 
Information Held 
bv Informed A•enta 
Info. on Poe terior Actual 
Csrd Prob (X) State 
No card 1/3 y 
No card 1/3 y 
No card 1/3 x 
No card 1/3 y 
0100101010 0.15 y 
OOOOOOOOll 0.555 x 
0100110100 0.15 y 
0000010000 o. 77 y 
lllOOOOOll 0.062 y 
1010000011 0.15 x 
lllllllOOl 0.003 y 
No Card 1/3 x 
No Card 1/3 x 
No Card 1/3 y 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
x l x 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
None 0.4 y 
None 0.4 y 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
x l x 
None 0.4 x 
None 0.4 y 
None 0.4 y 
None 0.4 x 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
x 1 x 
y 0 y 
Posterior 
Prob. 
x y z 
No Card .35 .25 .40 z 
No card . 35 . 25 .40 x 
No card . 35 . 25 .40 z 
x 1 0 0 x 
x 1 0 0 x 
y 0 1 0 y 
z 0 0 1 z 
z 0 0 1 z 
y 0 1 0 y 
y 0 1 0 y 
x 1 0 0 x 
y 0 1 0 y 
z 0 0 1 z 
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expectations models so dropped it  from the next and then subsequent 
market experiments . 
In all remaining periods of all markets only a subset of 
the agents received information about the realized state of nature.  
The design, as  displayed in  Figure 1 ,  has a subset of agents from 
each dividend type (preference type) receiving information about states 
in addition to the prior information. This allows a comparison of the 
behavior of the " insiders , "  those with additional information, with 
noninsiders, those with only prior information. In all markets exac tly 
half of the agents of each type ( two of four) were "insiders . "  In 
market 1 there was only one (out o f  three) insider of each dividend type.  
Information received by insiders was different in market 1,  
so it is discussed separately . In market 1 ,  starting with period 5 ,  
three individuals , one of  each type (the insiders) , were given a "clue" 
about the state of nature. This "clue" was a sample of ten draws with 
replacement.  The �ample was taken from-urn X containing balls marked 
"O" and " I" (pr(O j X) .. 4/5 ,  pr(I j X) = 1/5)  if the state randomly chosen 
was X and the sample was drawn from urn Y (pr (O j Y) = 3/5 ,  pr ( I j Y) = 2/5)  
if the randomly chosen state was Y .  The samples given the three insiders 
is shown in column 9 of Figure 1 together with the Bayesian pos terior 
probabilities of the state, given the sample. If the insiders were 
perfect Bayesians, then their subj ective probabilities of the state , 
given the information they received, would be those in the figure . 
The results of market 1 suggested that the markets would 
adjust to the general pattern of information in the market .  But some 
replica tions may be necessary for each information pattern before 
equilibrium is finally established for that information pattern. 
A reduction in the number of different information patterns would 
thus result in a reduction of periods necessary to see equilibrating 
behavior should it exist .  In all markets after market 1 (periods 5 
through 11 in market 2 ,  3 through 12 in market 3 ,  and so forth) the 
information contained on the "clue card" received by the insiders 
indicated the realized state of the nature with certainty . 
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Information that everyone knows publicly (as opposed to 
privately) is called common knowledge (Aumann 1976) . Since the 
instructions were read publicly , each agent knew what o ther agents 
had ob tained from that source of information. In particular , every 
agent knew that no one knew how many and who the insiders were. The 
exceptions are periods 1 through 4 of market 1 ,  periods 1 through 4 
of market 2, periods 1 through 3 of market 5 in all of which the fac t 
that no one had any information was announced and also in period 11 
of  market 1 in which the clue was publicly announced . Additional
common knowledge of possible importance was that the clues of all 
insiders were identical . From the nature of the instructions agents 
could deduce in all but market 1 that the allocation to agent types 
remained constant during the experiment and that the dividend values 
for every type remained constant.  Agents did not know the number of 
agent types although in markets 3, 4, and 5 they were told that 
the dividends of o thers may differ from their own (in 1 and 2 nothing 
was said) and they did not know that the insiders were the same agents 
throughout the relevant periods . 
The dividend parameters for all markets are summarized in 
Figure 2 .  Agents in each experiment were partitioned into three types 
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FIGURE 2 
DIVIDEND PARAMETERS 
ALL MARKETS 
Investor No. of Initial Endowment Dollar Dividends Prior Probability Expected 
Market TyEe Investors Certificate Francs Fixed Cost :eer Franc x y z x y z Dividend 
I 3 2 10,000 10,000 150 350 28 3.3 
1 II 3 2 10,000 10,000 0.002 250 300 1/3 2/3 283.3 
III 3 2 10,000 10,000 300 100 166.7 
I 4 2 10,000 10,000 100 350 266.7 
2 II 4 2 10,000 10,000 0.002 200 300 1/3 2/3 266.7 
III 4 2 10,000 10,000 240 175 196.6 
I 4 2 10,000 10,000 400 100 220 
3 II 4 2 10,000 10,000 0.003 300 150 0.4 0.6 210 
III 4 2 10,000 10,000 125 175 155 
I 4 2 10,000 10,000 375 100 210 
4 II 4 2 10,000 10,000 0.003 275 150 0.4 0.6 200 
III 4 2 10,000 10,000 100 175 145 
I 4 2 10,000 10,000 120 170 320 212.5 
5 II 4 2 10,000 10,000 0.003 155 245 135 0.35 0.25 0.4 169.5 
III 4 2 10,000 10,000 180 100 160 152 
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(designated as I ,  II, III) according to dividend returns. There were 
four agents of each type except in market 1 where there were three. 
This provided markets with twelve agents except market 1 in which 
there were nine. Each period each agent had an initial endowment of 
two certificates giving a market supply of twenty-four units (eighteen 
for market 1) . In addition, each period each agent was given 10,000 
francs in working cap ital which was returned to the experimenter at the 
end of the period by the imposition of a fixed cost of 10, 000 francs .  
The conversion rates o f  dollars per franc are on the table. 
Dividends were paid on each security held at the end of the 
period. The dividends differed by agent type and according to the s tate 
of nature.  Reading Figure 2 we  can see that in  market 1 there are two 
possible states , X and Y.  An agent of type I receives 150 francs for 
every certificate held if the state is X and 350 francs per certificate 
if the s tate is Y.  The dividends for o ther types and o ther markets are 
determined similarly. For example , in market 5 there are three possible 
states (X, Y, and Z) and an agent of type I receives dividends per 
certificate of 120,  170, or 320 depending upon whether the state is 
X, Y, or Z .  
The prior probabilities o f  states are i n  the ninth column. 
These and the dividends were chosen so that the prices and allocations 
predicted by competing models would reasonably be separated . The final 
column gives the expected value of a certificate for a given type of 
agent based on the prior probabilities . 
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III .  MODELS 
We focus on two competing ideas. The first is the prior 
information equilibrium hypothesis and the second is the rational 
expectations equilibrium hypothesis.  For completeness ,  however , 
a third set of three models will be mentioned. 
The prior information equilibrium hypo thesis bas been the 
traditional vehicle for incorporating uncertainty into market and 
o ther economic models.  Each individual , i ,  is provided with endowment
- i of securities , xi' a priori information, p (6) about the state of
i -nature 6. Demand functions , xi= D ( p , xi ) are then generated from 
the theory that individuals attempt to 
\ i i max l u ( xi , 6) p  (6)xi 6 
subj ect to p ( xi -
i
i)= O .
Prices are determined by the law of supply and demand 
I i - 1-l D ( p , x  ) - l x i = O. i 1 i 
For the market settings and parameters described for the 
experiments above the application of this model is straightforward. 
In the absence of risk aversion, at any price below the expected 
dividend value, agents will demand as many units as their working 
capital will buy. At prices above the expected dividend value, agents 
will sell the two units initially endowed and would sell more if short 
sales were permitted. Market demand will thus be "horizontal" until 
the capital constraint becomes binding as shown on Figure 3 and the 
Price 
dI = max Edi 
i 
du 
d - i III m n Ed i 
i 
E • NIII
FIGURE 3 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTIONS 
E • (NIII + NII)
W
I 
dI 
Total Net Trades 
W
i 
= initial working capital of investors of type i. 
W
I + WII WI + WII + WIII 
dII dIII 
Ni 
= number of agents in the market of dividend type i. 
E = initial endowment of securities per agent. 
di = dividend of agents of dividend type i. 
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demand price will equal the expected dividend value of the agent type 
with the maximum expected dividend . Supply is limited by the initial 
endowments. 
The predictions of this model for various states and 
information conditions imposed across all experiments are summarized 
in Figure 4 .  These figures are simply taken from Figure 2 by determining 
the_ type of agent with the maximum expected value. The model predicts 
both price and final allocations . For example, in market 2 the price 
will be 266 in state X because uninformed individuals of both types I 
and II have an expr.cted value of 266 .  All other agents have lower 
expected values and should thus sell to these four agents who have a 
horizontal demand at that price.  
The second model is the rational expectations equilibrium 
model. It  is based on the principle of an expectations equilibrium in 
the sense that individuals condition their expectations about the 
underlying state of nature upon the equilibrium values of the endogenous 
variables of the system. The equilibria themselves must be consistent 
with this type of "adaptive" behavior. A variety of models exist 
depending upon the information conveyed to agents by the equilibrium 
values ,  the inference process of agents , etc . but, for the parameter 
values and settings we chose for the experimental markets , the 
predictions of various rational expectations models seem to be 
substantially in agreement.  
The prior information equilibrium prices given states X, Y, 
and Z are no t the same and the prior information equilibrium net trade 
matrices are no t the same in each state. Furthermore , prices and net 
trades are no t the same in states X, Y, and Z given tha t fully informed 
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equilibria are attained in the state. Therefore, individuals who have 
no external information about the state o f  nature but who observe all 
transactions should,  according to the rational expectations equilibrium 
models,  infer the s tates of nature and adjust their behavior accordingly . 
The resul ting predictions are as follows in Figure 5 .  
No tice that the critical differences between the price 
predictions of the two models occurs when the expected value of the 
certificate based upon the prior information and dividends of the 
uninformed individuals lies above the rational expectations equilibrium 
price.  The rational expectations equilibrium models predict that such 
individuals will revise their expectations downward based on market 
generated information and allow the price to fall .  
The pattern of holdings predicted by the two models almost 
always differs . The rational expectations model predicts that the 
uninformed individuals will behave the same as the insiders since 
market price here is "fully revealing . "  Thus , the prior information 
equilibrium predicts that only the insiders of a given type can hold 
while the rational expectations model predicts that all members of this 
type can hold . 
For convenience of exposition the competing predictions can 
be summarized by the following two hypo theses . 
Hypothesis l: Prices converge to the prior information equilibrium 
values given in Figure 4 .  
Al ternate Hypothesis 1: Prices converge to the rational expectations 
equilibrium values given in Figure 5 .  
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FIGURE 4 
PRIOR INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM MODEL PREDICTIONS 
Price Type of Agent Holding Certificates in Equilibrium 
Market Information of Insiders Information of Insiders 
None x y z None x y z 
2 266 266* 350 I and II I and II I 
uninfonned* insiders* 
3 220 400 220* I I I 
insiders* uninformed* 
4 210 375 210* I I I 
insiders* uninformed* 
5 212 212* 245 320 I I II I 
uninformed* insiders* insiders 
*The prediction here differs from the rational expectation model.
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FIGURE 5 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM MODEL PREDICTIONS 
Price Type of Agent Holding Certificates in Equilibrium 
Market Information of Insiders Information of Insiders 
None x y z None x y z 
2 266 240* 350 I and II III* I* 
3 220 400 175* I I* III* 
4 210 375 175* I I* III* 
5 212 180* 245 320 I III* II* I* 
*The prediction here differs from the prior information equilibrium model. 
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Hypothesis 2 :  Security holdings converge to the prior information 
equilibrium values given in Figure 4 .  
Alternate Hypothesis 2 :  Security holdings converge t o  the rational 
expectations equilibrium values given in Figure S. 
Two additional measures are relevant for separating the 
prior information and rational expectation ideas.  The first is profit. 
The second is market efficiency. 
If the market data are completely revealing of the state, 
then insider information is of no value. Thus , under the rational 
expectations hypothesis insiders should do no better than uninformed 
individuals. In some respects this may be a better indicator of 
market generated informatio n  than the final holdings. Risk averse, 
uninformed individuals may reap the benefits of  almost full information 
by selling to informed individuals at near equilibrium prices and 
avoid the risk of holding in the absence of  certainty . The holdings 
data could then be used to reject the rational expectations model even 
though the uninformed acted with very little uncertainty .  
Hypothesis 3 :  Profits of insiders are greater than the profits of 
the uninformed agents as implied by the prior information equilibrium 
prices and allocations given in Figure 4 .  
Alternate Hypo thesis 3 :  Profits o f  insiders and the uninformed agents
converge to equality as implied by the rational expectations equilibrium 
prices and allocations given in Figure S. 
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Market efficiency is ex ante consumer plus producer surplus . 
For these markets it can be measured by the total profit of agents . 
A market operating at 100 percent efficiency will maximize the total 
dollar returns of agents given the information that exists in the 
market. Ordinarily the measure (Plott and Smith 1978)  is efficiency 
in absolute terms . 
The concept of efficiency when applied to markets with 
insiders is complicated by two considerations . First ,  uncertainty 
�xists so the measure must reflect the information which exists in 
the market. The following measure seems to be  the appropriate general!-
zation to the case of uncertainty: 
PS efficiency 
Total expected returns to allocation,  A,  
conditioned on available information 
in the market .  
Total expec ted return of ratlonal -
expectations allocation, A, conditioned
on information in the market.  
ER(A I I)  
ER(A I I)
The idea is that the rational expectations allocation yields the 
maximum which can be reasonably expected. PS efficiency is simply 
the expected value of the actual allocation taken as a percentage 
of that maximum. 
The second problem involves initial endowments . The markets 
we studied are reasonably efficient even if no trade takes place.  In 
order to emphasize this fact  we have constructed a measure which takes 
as "zero" the no trading case. Let X be the no trade allocation of
initial endowments.  
Trading efficiency= TE 
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ER(A j I) minus (expected returns of X conditioned
upon information in the market) 
ER(A j I)  minus (expected returns of X conditioned
upon information in the market) 
S ince different models sometimes predic t different allocations , 
the efficiency measure of the actual allocation when compared with the 
efficiency predicted can be used as a measure of the relative accuracy 
of competing models.  Of  course this measure defines the efficiency of 
the rational expectations equilibrium allocation to be 100 percent . 
The efficiency of the prior information equilibrium allocation differs 
from this only when certain events occur. Figure 6 lists the efficiency 
of the prior information equilibrium allocation (both PS and TE) for all 
information conditions of all experiments . 
Hypothesis 4 :  Plott-Smith (PS) and Trading ( TE) measures of efficiency 
converge to the values given in Figure 6 which are implied by the prior 
information equilibrium. 
Alternate Hypothesis 4 :  PS and TE measures of efficiency converge to 
100 percent in all cases as implied by the rational expectations 
equilibrium. 
Three ideas must  be listed for completeness.  First ,  the 
Keynes model ( 1936) suggests that speculation can cause the price to 
be unrela ted to underlying returns and information. Some may even 
claim that price can be anything. Due to a problem recognized by 
Beja (1976) and Milgrom (1979) certain formalizations of the fully 
revealing or efficient marke t hypothesis can lead to such a conclusion.  
2 3 
If price is a sufficient statis tic for the state, individuals can 
ignore all their private information thereby yielding all prices in 
the range of the equilibrium price correspondence as equilibria for 
all states of nature. On this interpretation prices should be at 
one of the rational expec tations equilibrium prices but beyond that 
there need be no relationship between the actual state, the underlying 
returns and information,  and the price .  This implies rejection of all 
four pairs of hypotheses discussed above .  
The second i s  the strong version of the efficient markets 
hypo thesis which suggests that prices adjust instantaneously to all 
available information. Replication of time periods is unnecessary to 
establish equilibria. 
The third is the crystal ball hypothesis which maintains that 
market adjus tments reflect informatio n  beyond that held by agents . I t  
is tempting t o  assert that "agents will somehow know" and then apply 
a model as if they do. This hypothesis would have markets adjusting 
perfectly even when no agent has information beyond prior information.  
IV .  RESULTS 
The time series of prices for all periods of all markets are 
shown on Figure 7 through 11. Price predictions of the prior information 
model when different from those of  the rational expec tations equilibrium 
model are shown by the horizontal dotted line. Predictions of the 
rational expectations equilibrium model are shown by the horizontal 
sol id line. 
Hypotheses about prices , 1 and Alternate 1, are tested in two 
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FIGURE 6 
PRIOR INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATION EFFICIENCIES 
Measure Information State 
Market Type No Information x y z 
1 PS 100 50 100 
TE 100 -125 100 
2 PS 100 42 100 
TE 100 -133 100 
3 PS 100 100 5 7  TE 100 100 -125 
4 PS 100 100 5 7 TE 100 100 -125 
5 PS 100 67 100 100 TE 100 -112 100 100 
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steps, first agains t each o ther and then the winner agains t the random 
price behavior .  Hypothesis 1 a s  well a s  the random behavior hypothesis 
is rej ected in favor of Alternate Hypothesis 1, that prices converge 
to the rational expec tations predictions . 
In Step 1, across all periods of all markets, the price 
3 predictions of the competing models differed seventeen times . 
Figure 12 summarizes three statistics for these seventeen periods . 
In all but four periods average price is closer to the rational 
expectations equilibrium than to the prior information equilibrium. 
Similarly in thirteen of the seventeen periods the average absolute 
and squared deviations from the rational expectations equilibrium 
are smaller than the corresponding deviations from the prior information 
equilibrium. Further, the relative advantage of the RE over the PI 
model increases upon replication. 
The three exceptions are of interest .  Two exceptions are 
periods 6 and 8 of market 1, the pilot.  These observations lead us to 
suspect that the prior expectations model was the better model . The 
remaining experimental design was developed to demonstrate this possibility 
within a framework of reduced states ( from the agents point of view) 
which would give markets adequate time to adjust .  The next exception 
is period 7 of market 2 .  This i s  the first time this particular state 
occurred in the market. The next time it  occurs (period 9) prices start
high and then fall immediately to near the rational expectations price 
although viewing average price of period 9 one might include it as an 
exception. Thus, the few cases where the prior expectations model does 
better than the rational expectations occur in the early stages of 
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experience acquisition. With replication the advantages of the prior 
expectations model are not sustained. 
Market 5 was designed as a check on the robustness of the 
rational expectations equilibrium model . Because the three-state 
situation is inherently more complicated, new theories can be developed 
to compete with the theory of fully revealing prices . In particular, 
we thought the market might reveal only part of the available information. 
That is, it may reveal that nature has no t chosen some state as opposed 
to revealing exactly which state was chosen. In the two-state world, 
revelation of one s tate which is no t, is equivalent to complete state 
revelation. The three-state world is different. The maximum expec ted 
values of uninformed agents by type and by partial information revealed 
is calculated in Figure 13. As is shown on the price time series, prices 
never approach these values in periods in which they might be sensibly 
predicted . The rational expectations model applies to the three-state 
environment as readily as to the two-state environment . 
In the second step, Alternate Hypothesis 1 was compared to 
the random price behavior hypothesis . Out of 398 nonzero price changes 
in the five markets, 284 price changes were in the direction of rational 
expectations equilibrium price. Since under random behavior only one 
half of these changes would be expected to move the price in the 
direction of RE price, the probability of the observed behavior being 
generated by random chance is practically zero ( 8 . 5  standard deviations 
away from the mean) . Similar s tatistics are ob tained by testing for 
convergence of mean squared error and mean absolute deviation from 
rational expectations price towards zero upon replication. 
Statistic 1 (�) (8) 
1. Absolute Difference 0.38 0.22 
between Average and 
Equilibrium Pricel 
2. Root Hean Squared 0.36 0.24 
Deviation from 
Equilibrium Price2
3. Hean Absolute 0.36 0.23 
Deviation from
Equilibrium Price3
FIGURE 12 
RATIOS OF THREE MEASURES OF DEVIATION FROM THE PI AND RE EQUILIBRIUM PRICES 
DURING PERIODS WHEN THE TWO ARE DIFFERENT 
Market 
(Period) 
2 3 4 
(7) (9) (3) (5) (6) (8) (10) (5) (7) (B) 
0.60 0.01 2.28 4. 72 22.4 5.64 6.70 2.98 3.43 4.24 
0.61 0.80 1. 72 4.00 4.51 4.88 6.1 2.95 3.30 3.98 
0.60 0.98 1. 78 4.74 5.52 5.61 6.67 2.99 3.43 4.28 
1. IP - P Prior I! IP - PRE I ; P • average price. 
2. 
3.
/i<Pi - PPrior)2/i(Pi - PRE)2
<LIPi - PPriorl>l<LIPi - PRE!)
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5 
(10) (12) (4) (5) (11) 
5.27 10.21 8.56 7.5 107.3 
4.39 9.09 7 .94 7.44 2.87 
5.28 10.27 8.57 7.55 3.75 
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FIGURE 13 
CONDITIONAL EXPECTED VALUES 
MAXIMUM EXPECTED 
INFORMATION VALUES AGENT 
The state is not Z 192 II uninformed 
The state is not Y 227 I uninformed 
The s tate is not X 262 I uninformed 
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Hypo thesis 2 can be rejected in favor of its al ternative. 
The rational expectations equilibrium model is clearly superior to 
the prior information model . The error rate of both models is 
summarized in Figure 14. Each model predicts the type of agents who 
will hold the certificates . The figure lists the number of certificates 
in the wrong hands from the point of view of each model . The models 
made different predictions in thirty-six periods including market 1. 
In twenty-nine of these thirty-six periods the rational expectations 
model involved fewer errors and in a substantial number of these 
(eighteen of thirty-six) the rational expectations model made no errors 
at all . In seventeen periods the predictions were disjoint and in 
thirteen of the seventeen the error rate for the rational expectations 
model was lower and the four exceptions were all during "adjustment" 
periods.  
An examination of the trading activities of the uninformed 
agents in periods when others were informed is particularly useful . 
Negative numbers in Figure 15 indicate the trading activity on the part 
of the uninformed agents which is consistent with the prior information 
model and inconsistent with the rational expectations model . Similarly, 
positive numbers record the trading activity of the uninformed which 
is consistent with the RE and inconsistent with the PI model . When 
the two models make contradictory predictions about their trading 
activity, behavior of the uninformed tends to conform to the PI model 
in early periods but upon replication, as the experience is gained, 
the RE model dominates the PI .  No te that the behavior of uninformed 
individuals in contradiction to the PI model implies that these agents 
Total No. 
Market Cer tif ica tes 
1 18 
2 24 
3 24 
4 24 
5 24 
FIGURE 14 
NUMBER OF CERTIFICATES IN WRONG HANDS 
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS VS. PRIOR INFORMATION HYPOTHESIS 
Period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Realized State y y x y y x y y 
Rational Expectations 1 12 0 8 
0 2 2 3 
Prior Expectations 8 4 7 4 
Realized State x x y y y y x y 
Rational Expectations 22 0 
1 2 0 -1 0 0 
Prior Expectations 4 5 
Realized State x y y x y y x y 
Rational Expectations 18 0 10 9 0 2 
10 11 
Prior Expectations 15 8 19 19 11 24 
Realized State x y y x y x y y 
Rational Expectations 7 0 3 5 
13 16 19 19 
Prior Expectations 21 2 21 21 
Realized State z x z x x y z z 
Rational Expectations 13 4 10 0 0 
11 1 0 
Prior Expectations 11 20 13 5 0 
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9 10 11 12 13 14 
y x y 
0 2 1 
x y y 
12 0 0 
23 5 7 
x y y x 
0 2 
0 0 
6 24 
x y x y x y 
0 4 0 4 0 
17 
2 21 0 21 2 
y y x y z 
0 0 0 0 0 
7 9 24 11 14 
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FIGURE 15 
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE TRADING BEHAVIOR OF THE UNINFORMED 
PREDICTED BY RE AND PI MODELS 
Row 1. Certificates purchased per uninformed agent for which the models have opposite predictions: the PI model 
predicts sales while the RE model predicts purchases. 
Row 2. Certificates sold per uninformed agent for which the models have opposite predictions: the PI model predicts 
purchases while the RE model predicts sales. 
Market Period 
Experiment 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Realized State y x y y 
1 Row 1 0.5 0.5 
Row 2 0 -0.5 
Realized State x y x y y 
2 Row 1 -1 -1.5 
Row 2 -2.5 2 -0.75 2 2 
, 
Realized State y x y y x y x y 
3 Row 1 -1. 5 2 0.5 1. 5 3.5 5 1 4.5 
Row 2 -2. 5 -0.5 -0.25 2 2 
Realized State y x y y x y x y x 
4 Row 1 -1. 5 -1 -1.5 0 -1 -0.5 -2 1 -1 
Row 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Realized State x y z z y y x y z 
5 Row 1 -0.5 -0.5 0.5 -2 1. 5 2.5 2 3.5 5 
Row 2 0 -3 2 2 2 2 
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were so sure of having learned the state from the endogenous variables 
that they chose to hold these positions even though they could have 
avoided all uncertainty by trading , usually very close to the rational 
expectations equilibrium price. 
The profits of insiders relative to the uninformed agents,  
summarized in Figure 16 rej ect Hypothesis 3 in favor of its alternative . 
Shown there for each period of each market is the ratio of average 
profit per insider to the average profit per uninformed agent earned 
during the period. In all cases the ratios approach one as the 
experience in the market accumulates . The early "jumps" reflect first 
experiences with a new state. During initial periods insiders have the 
advantage. After replication, however , the advantages of inside 
information vanish completely. 
Both efficiency measures are shown for all periods of all 
markets in Figures 7 through 11. As can be seen, these are high . 
The fourth hypothesis is formalized as follows . 
Let I be the set of periods for which the prior information 
equilibrium price is different from the rational expectations equilibrium 
price which is a necessary and sufficient condition for the prior 
information equilibrium allocations (A) to be different from the 
rational expectations equilibrium allocations (A) across agents classified
by dividend dis tributions . Let i E: I, and PS (x) and TE(x) be the Plo tt-Smith 
and trading efficiency measures of an allocation x. Let xi be the 
actually realized allocation in period i .  Then Hypothesis 4 asserts 
that for trading efficiency : 
I I I TE (Ai) - TE (xi) II < II I TE (xi) - TE(Ai) IIie:I iE:I 
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and similar relationship holds for PS efficiency. Note that TE (Ai) 
is defined to be 100 percent. 
The data in Figure 17 rej ect Hypo thesis 4 in favor of its 
al ternative. The mean efficiencies are much closer to the rational 
expectations prediction (100) than to the prior information prediction 
of 57 for PS efficiency and -123 for trading efficiency . Chronogically, 
as the traders gain experience,  the efficiency measures move consis tently 
from close to prior information prediction towards the rational expecta-
tions predictions . Out of eleven changes in efficiency measures repeated 
in Figure 17, nine changes are away from prior information towards the 
rational expectations prediction. The probability of  obtaining nine 
out of eleven changes of the same sign by random chance is only 0 . 039.  
We feel we can safely rej ect the strong rational expectations 
model, the Keynes model, and the crystal ball model as general model s .  
Markets take time t o  adjust to structural changes so the strong rational 
expectations model can be rej ected. After the rational expectations 
equilibrium is established, prices change instantaneously in response 
to different realizations of state but a structural change such as a 
new and unknown state of nature will no t be instantaneously adjusted to . 
In this sense we have replicated a finding in Forsythe, Palfrey, and 
Plott (1980) . The early periods of no information adjust closely to the 
expec ted value and come nowhere close to the perfectly informed equilibria 
so the crystal ball hypothesis is discredited. 
Our version of Keynes can be rej ected because the rational 
expectations model does so well .  The problem i s  of  course that our model 
does no t fully capture the idea that speculation on speculators can cause 
FIGURE 1 6  
NET PROFIT OF INFORMED AGENTS AS A PERCENT OF 
NET PROFIT OF UNINFORMED AGENTS* 
Per iod Realized I Market j State 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1  1 2  1 3  
� 108 
?77//T//0,i 
x 68 
1 1 0� 1 1 8  14 7 � - 5 3  ;;'. 1 I 9 1  109 9 8� y 8 8  1 1 8  w/////////La 
x I/,, 8 5  1 0 5 ZI 6208 267 
2 I 
y 1 0 7  1 0 9  1 0 5  
x 103 101 
3 I 
y 1 0 2  9 3  
x 1 4 2  
4 I 
y 128 1 2 3  1 1 8  1 1 9  
x 1 1 5  1 0 5  
5 I y 141 102 1 01 100 
z 1 5 7  1 3 5  9 7  
* There was no d ifference in information provided to various individuals during periods covered 
by hatched boxes . F igures are given for control. 
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FIGURE 1 7  
EFFICIENCY MEASURES FOR PERIODS I N  WHICH PRIOR INFORMATION EQUILIBRIUM ALLOCATIONS 
DIFFER FROM THAT OF THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS MODEL 
Under Actual Allocations 
Efficiency Under Prior Info rmation ( listed fo r each period Under RE 
Market Measure* Eguilibrium Allocations chrono logically) Eguilibrium Allocations 
2 PS 4 2  5 7 ' 7 0  100 
(State X) TE - 1 3 3  - 7 2 , -10 100 
3 PS 5 7  7 9 ,  8 8 , 8 9 ,  9 8 ,  9 9  1 0 0  
(State Y) TE - 1 2 5  1 3 ,  3 8 , 4 7 , 8 8 , 9 4  1 0 0  
4 PS 5 7  9 2 ,  9 5 ,  9 3 , 94 , 9 4  100 
(State Y) TE - 1 2 5  5 9 ' 7 2 '  6 6 '  69 ' 69 100 
5 PS 6 7  8 2 ,  9 4 , 1 0 0  1 0 0  
(State X) TE -112 -1 5 ,  6 5 , 100 100 
Mean PS 5 7  88 . 3 100 
Efficiency TE - 1 2 3  4 5 . 5 100 
* 
PS = Plott-Smith ( 19 7 8) efficiency measure. 
TE = trading efficiency measure. 
See Sect ion III for discussio n .  
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price to wander. If we treat any evidence of (nonrational expec tations) 
equilibrium behavior as support for the Keynes model , then the 
Keynes model deserves a closer look. During the no-information 
periods o f  the first three experiments,  prices converged to near 
the maximum expected value . In market 4 this did not happen . 
Prices remained well below the maximum expected value for the first 
four periods while the no-information condition was in effect , and 
returned to the low levels in period 14 when the no-information 
condition was imposed again. The same phenomena occurred during 
the first three periods , the no-information condition of market 5 .  
In both cases prices converge to a rational expectations equilibrium 
price, but it  is the wrong price, given the information.  The 
Beja/Milgrom criticism of rational expectations rests on the possible 
existence of  exactly this type of  phenomenon.  
We suspect the failure to adjust to the maximum expected 
value resulted from the fac t that no one knew that no one was 
informed in market 4. This in essence adds two subj ective states, 
giving a total of  four (X and no one knows , Y and no one knows, X 
with insiders , Y with insiders) and thus would increase the number 
of total replications necessary for the convergence behavior.  
The large number of holdings on the "wrong" side of the market 
supports this hypothesis . For the first three periods of market 5 
all agents should have known that no one was informed since no clue 
card was passed out as had been the case in the previous markets 
in which they had participated, nor was the method of giving clues 
even explained. We suspect,  however , some possible confusion, as 
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subj ects speculated on the possible sources of others ' information, 
thereby increasing the state spac e .  Notice that the holdings 
were converged to the rational expectations pattern even though 
price had not adj usted. In sunonary , we suspect these uninformed 
periods provide support for a theory o f  temporary equilibria as 
opposed to the possible existence of "Keynesian type" phenomena . 
Given the state of the data and theory, we cannot draw any firm 
conclusions . 
The o ther period of interest in this regard is period 10 of
experiment 1.  Notice that price is increasing substantially above the 
expected value prediction. In all twelve trades above the expected
value the buyer was the same agent and he was an insider. This individual 
was simply overly optimistic given his information. The fact that this 
unwarranted ( in theory and in fact) optimum did not serve as a lure 
for uninformed individuals does not reflect well on the Keynesian 
model . This was a good opportunity for a "bubble" but one did not 
develop. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATED ISSUES 
Rational Expectations Formation 
Since no theoretical models predict the path (as opposed to 
the end point) of the learning process in asset markets, we cannot 
conduct formal tests of theory. In this section we provide some 
descriptive material in the hope that generation of such data may 
help promote development of dynamic models of learning in competitive 
asset markets . 
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In our markets, at  least two kinds of  learning are identifiable . 
At the beginning of the f irst  period of a market, uninformed agents do 
not know the state, and no agent knows what the market price would be 
under any given s tate. The formal models referenced in earlier sections 
of the paper are concerned primarily with the learning about the state. 
Knowledge of the equilibrium price and net trade correspondence, given 
a common pattern of  information in the market , is reflected in agents ' 
decisions. From studying the static models one could easily infer 
that agents mus t  firs t learn about the equilibrium price and net trade 
correspondence ( the price given the state) and then learn about the 
state from market conditions , e . g .  price.  Applied to the markets 
studied here this reasoning suggests that an . agent must learn first 
about the structure of  the dividends under various sta tes and then 
learn about the state given the market conditions if (s )he is not 
an insider. 
In the experimental markets the two types of learning do 
not seem to occur sequentially. Instead they seem to occur 
simultaneously . 
The profit data can be used to make the point. The ratio of 
profits of buyers to sellers reflects the state of knowledge about the 
state-price correspondence. Insiders and uninformed agents are 
represented in equal numbers on both sides of the market (except in 
market 1 where three out of nine are insiders) .  Furthermore, initial 
endowments of sellers should be transferred to buyers at prices 
approximating the value of the initial endowments of buyers and which 
afford buyers very little profit on the transac tion. Therefore, profits 
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of buyers and sellers might reasonably be expec ted to be equal if the 
equilibr ium price correspondence has been revealed and understood.  
Thus , as the ratio of profits of buyers to sellers goes to one, we can 
say agents have learned to state equilibrium price correspondence. 
Learning about the state , given market conditions , is reflected 
in the differences between profits of insiders who are perfectly informed 
about the state (with the exception of market 1 where information is 
imperfect) and the uninformed agents .  I f  the difference is zero ( if the 
ratio is one) , then the informed agents ( insiders) and uninformed agents 
are equally informed. 
For each experiment the ratio of buyer and seller profits for 
each period is shown in Figure 16 . The ratjo  of profits of insiders 
and uninformed agents is shown in Figure 16 .  As can be seen, bo th 
measures converge to near one as replications occur and all agents 
become informed about both correspondences . Notice that the convergence 
occurs simultaneously . Thus , given these measuring devices , we conclude 
that learning about the price , given the state, and learning about the 
state, given the market , occur simultaneously and not sequentially as 
the comparative s tatic models suggest. 
Sources of Agent Information 
While these markets are simple relative to naturally occurring 
markets, they are nevertheless complex. The results indicate that 
agents are receiving accurate information from some source but the exac t 
source could no t be determined . Bids , offers , and contracts were all 
made publ icly by voice interaction. All were written on the blackboard . 
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FIGURE 1 8  
RATIO OF PROFITS OF BUYERS T O  PROFITS OF SELLERS 
Type of Per iod 
Market Buyers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  11 12 13 14 
I 1. 5 8 1. 4 9  1. 3 9 1. 41 1. 03
1 I I  
III 1. 5 3 5. 3 0
I 1. 44 1. 1 2 1 .  20 1. 2 0  1 . 14
2 I I  
III 4. 6 6 1 .  7 2  
I 1. 64 1. 1 3 1. 03 1. 03
3 I I  
III 1. 60 1. 3 6  1. 29 1. 2 0 1 . 14 1 . 09 
I 2. 1 2 1. 90 1. 5 6 1. 2 8
4 II 
III 1. 31 1. 3 3  1 .  2 7 1 . 2 2  1. 1 8 1. 3 7
I 2. 6 9  1. 34 1. 2 5
5 II 1. 4 0 1. 0 8  1. 0 6 1. 0 6
I I I  1. 3 9  1. 1 6 1. 0 6
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The timing of activities occurred in  real time and on  occasion curses , 
laughter, or o ther signs of emo tion may have been detectable in spite of 
efforts to control it.  
From a formal point of  view much more information was 
available than equilibrium prices . Thus , more information was available 
than is called for by the efficient markets hypothesis (Grossman 1978 ; 
Jordan 1979) . But it was not clear what information was used . 
We made two attempts to narrow the possibilities some . After the 
market, a questionnaire was circulated which attempted to measure the 
extent to which individuals could identify insiders.  Recall the method 
of distributin� inside information did not reveal the identity of insiders . 
Generally, insiders seemed to be more aware of o ther insiders than 
were those who were uninformed . Most uninformed would correctly guess 
at least one insider if their options were limited to two . We conj ecture,  
however, that knowledge of insiders ' identity is not a necessary condition 
for convergence in these markets.  
The second at tempt involved an analysis of bids and offers . 
Notice in markets 3 ,  4 ,  and 5 that after some replications the �ning 
contract is near the rational expectations equilibrium price . Somehow 
the insiders are unable to take advantage of their privileged position 
without revealing the state of nature. Figure 19 suggests that one 
possible key is the pattern of bids and offers . Competition among 
insiders occupies much of the opening market activity . In Figure 19 
for each market for those periods in which insiders exist is given 
the proportion of all first market action, an opening bid or offer , 
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which involved an ins ider. The proportion of times an insider is 
involved with the second , third , sixth , and eighteenth market actions 
are also given. The cumulative proporations are also given. 
The relative activity of insiders decreases with time . 
The proportion of periods in which an insider made the first bid or 
offer in market 1 was . 75 ,  and it was . 20 ,  . 83 ,  . 89 ,  and . 80 for 
markets 2 through 5 respectively. The proportion of the first eighteen 
bids and offers during all relevant periods of market 1 made by insiders 
was . 39 and for markets 2 through 5 respectively it was . 41 ,  . 52 ,  . 74 ,  
and . 61.  In four of  the five markets relative activity of  insiders 
decreases with time. It seems as though competition, evidenced by 
compet ing bids and offers among insiders during the opening stages 
of a period reveals the state to the uninformed . 
The excep tion to the pattern, market 2 ,  is ins tructive and 
indicates the limitations of the measure we present.  The opening offers 
in market 2 were made by uninformed individuals . They were also "safe" 
in the sense that they would have been reasonable sales given that the 
high price state exis ted (recall in market 2 agents had experience with 
the environment under conditions of complete information) . Similarly, 
uninformed buyers can make safe opening bids . Information is revealed 
when someone (presumably an insider attemp ting to take advantage of the 
information) drops ( increases) the offer (bid) substantially below 
(above) the safe levels . Thus , it is not simply bids and offers which 
convey the information, but certain critical bids and offers seem to 
convey it.  Unfortunately at this time we cannot identify these 
opera t i on<i l ly.  
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F IGURE 1 9
RELATIVE ACTIVITY O F  INSIDERS IN EARLY STAGES O F  MARKETS 
Proportion of nth Market Action Cumulative Proportion of Market Actions 
Involving Ins iders Involving Ins iders up to nth Action 
Market n = 1 2 3 6 1 8  1 2 3 6 1 8  
1 0 . 7 5  0 . 00 0 . 5 0 0 . 2 5 0 . 00 0 . 7 5 0 . 3 9 0 . 4 2 0 . 4 2 0 . 3 9 
2 0 . 20 0 . 4 0 0 . 20 0 . 4 0 o . oo 0 . 20 0 . 3 0 0 . 2 7 0 . 4 0 0 . 4 1 
3 0 . 8 3 0 . 6 7 0 . 6 7 0 . 1 7 0 . 50 0 . 8 3 ' 0 . 7 5  o .  7 2  0 . 69 0 . 5 2 
4 0 . 8 9  0 . 8 9 1 . 00 0 . 67 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 9 0 . 8 9 0 . 9 3 0 . 8 0 0 . 7 4 
5 0 . 8 0 0 . 50 0 . 8 0 0 . 44 0 . 60 0 . 8 0 0 . 6 5 0 . 7 0 0 . 6 7 0 . 61 
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The discussion of bids , offers , trader identification and 
other endogenous sources of information suggests that the trading 
institutions themselves may be important in determining the applicability 
of the rational expectations models . Institutions can dictate the type 
of information available to participants . For example, a computerized 
market which masks bids,  offers , and trader identity or even volume 
may not operate as efficiently as one which does not .  The closed book 
of the specialis t is certainly an institution worthy of consideration 
in this regard . 
Statistical Analysis o f  Price Changes 
Even though only single-period securities are traded in 
these markets, their price data do have some properties typical o f  
stock markets . The price series becomes a fair game as rational 
expectations equilibrium is established . Further , the transaction-to-
transaction log price returns have a serial correlation very close to 
zero and their density function is leptokurtic ( fat tailed relative 
to the normal dene ity function) .  
The fair game efficient market model implies that it is not 
possible to devise trading rules based on pas t prices (weak form 
efficiency) that will earn abnormally high returns on a consistent 
basis (Fama 1 970) . We tested five trading rules : (1)  buy and hold , 
(2) trend filter, (3)  1- franc filter ,  (4)  5-franc filter, and ( 5) 25-franc 
4 filter. For the single-period security used in these markets , equilibrium 
return over time is zero . The naive buy and hold strategy yields a 
median return of 10 francs per period and mean return of 14 . 9  francs 
so 
per period which is significantly positive (see Figure 20) . This return 
is generated during the disequilibrium periods and declines to zero 
as rational expectations equilibrium is approached . Ordinary least 
squares regression of Buy and Hold returns (BHt) earned each period on 
the absolute difference between equilibrium and average trading price 
(dt , a measure of disequilibrium trading) yields the following estimates : 
2 BR = -1 . 86 + 0. 609 d , R = 0 . 14 ,  Durbin Watson statistic = 1 . 94 .t (-0 . 22)  ( 3 . 12) t 
T-statis tics are given in parentheses . 
The results suggest that the prof its generated by the buy and hold 
strategy are largely the product of disequilibrium trading . 
Trend and 1- and 5-franc filters perform about as well as 
the buy and hold strategy; the 25-franc fil ter performs worse than 
the buy and hold. As equilibrium is approached , the returns from 
these f ilters also approach zero . 
Returns from using the perfect advance knowledge of rational 
5 expectations equilibrium price are given in the last row of Figure 20 . 
These returns are equal to or greater than the buy and hold strategy 
and indicate that the knowledge of  equilibrium price is useful for 
trading in this market even though this price is no t always attained . 
In Keynes model this knowledge would not be useful for a single 
investor. 
The first order serial correlation of  log price changes 
(loge Pt
/Pt-l) is very close to zero . Serial correlation in data for
individual trading periods ranged from -0. 65 to 0 . 60 with a median of 
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FIGURE 2 0  
PROFIT FROM MECHANICAL TRADING RULES: 
TESTS OF FAIR GAME HYPOTHESIS* 
t-statistic 
Standard of Exces s  Prof it 
Median Mean Deviation over Buy & Hold 
Buy & Hold 1 0 . 0 14 . 9 5 3 . 9
Trend Filter 4 . 0 1 6 . 9 3 9 . 5  0 . 3 6 
1-Franc Filter 3 . 0 1 0 . 5 3 7 . 7  - 0 . 7 5 
5-Franc Filter 4 . 0 11 . 1 3 7 . 4 - 0 . 64 
2 5-Franc F ilter 0 . 0 2 . 1 3 3 . 8 - 2 . 1 6 
Perfect Information 10 . 0 2 6 . 1 4 0 . 3 2 . 0 9  about RE Price 
* 
The date for period 1 of market 4 were excluded in calculating the means . 
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0 . 00 and mean of -0. 022 (standard deviation 0. 30) . The magnitude of 
serial correlation does not seem to be affected by the existence of 
disequilibrium trades as is indicated by the following regression of  
estimated serial correlation for  each period (p t) on the absolute
deviation of average trading price from the RE equilibrium price dt 
pt = -0. 0357 + 0 . 00038 d 
(-0 . 83) ( 0 . 75) t 
T-statistics are given in parentheses , the coefficient of determination 
is 0 . 01 and Durbin-Watson statis tic is 1 .91 .  
The distribution of  relative price changes in  our markets 
is leptokurtic (fat tailed) compared to the normal distribution. Sample 
kurtosis ( fourth moment around mean divided by squared variance) in all 
five markets , 13 . 7 ,  19 . 3 , 52 . 9 ,  5 6 . 3 ,  and 30. 3 respectively , is much 
greater than the kurtosis of normal distribution which is 3. Relatively 
large proportions of observations in the peak of the distribution of  
price chartges derive from periods in  which trading is at or  close to 
the equilibrium price while the larger price changes in the tails of  
the distribution come mostly from trading away from equilibrium price . 
This observation might lead one to speculate that the leptokurtosis 
of security price returns is generated by disequilibrium trading and 
that reduction in disequilibrium trading would tend to bring the 
dis tribution closer to the normal . However , preliminary tests on 
our data do not support such a conclusion. For each market we identified 
periods when much of the trading was and was not close to equilibrium 
by visual examina tion of price series and calculated the kurtosis of 
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price changes observed in each class of  periods. The results are shown on 
Figure 21.  In three of  the five markets the kurtosis of  price changes 
observed in "equilibrium trading" periods alone is greater than that 
for "disequilibrium trading" periods.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Given time and replications these markets behave substantially 
as predicted by rational expectations equilibrium models . There seems 
to be no doubt that variables endogenous to the operation of  these 
markets served to accurately convey the s tate of nature to o therwise 
uninformed agents . We can conclude that the rational expectations 
models must be taken seriously as not universally misleading about 
the nature of human capabilities and markets .  Of course,  only 
additional research will determine to what extent the experiences 
acquired in these simple markets can be extended to more complicated 
naturally occurring markets. 
The exact variable (s)  which serve (s)  to inform the 
uninformed about the underlying state may differ according to the 
structure of the market institutions . Market institutions differ 
widely accoring to the nature of the endogenous variables observable 
by participants. Thus , institutional features might have implications 
for both the existence of rational expectat ions equilibria and the 
speed with which they are attained. In these double o ral auctions 
the key variables are not yet identified , but we suspect a knowledge 
of unaccepted bids and offers, in addition to price, are of primary 
importance.  
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FIGURE 21 
KURTOSIS OF RELATIVE PRICE CHANGES 
Disequilibrium Periods Equilibrium Periods All Periods 
Market 1 Periods 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  5 ,  7 ,  8 ,  9 ,  1 0  4 ,  6 ,  1 1  
Kurtosis 1 1 . 2 2 2. 1 1 3. 7 
Market 2 Periods 1 ,  2 ,  3 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8 ,  9 ,  1 0  4 ,  1 1  
Kurtosis 1 5. 7 o .  7 2 19. 3 
Market 3 Periods 1 ,  3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  6 ,  7 ,  8 2 ,  9 ,  10 , 1 1 , 1 2  
Kurtosis 6. 0 60. 7 5 2. 9 
Market 4 Periods 1 ,  2 ,  6 ,  9 ,  1 1 , 1 3 ,  14 3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  7 ,  8 ,  10 , 1 2  
Kurtosis 3 1 . 0  1 5. 6 5 6 . 3
Market 5 Periods 1 , 6 , 7 , 8 2 ,  3 ,  4 ,  5 ,  9 ,  1 0 , 1 1 ,  1 2 ,  1 3  
Kurtosis 9. 8 39. 1 30 . 3
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APPENDIX A 
MARKET PROCEDURES 
Market experiments 2-5 were conducted in three maj or steps : 
1 .  Training with the mechanism t o  draw the s tates of  nature. 
2. Explanation of procedures and rules of the market.
3 .  Conduc t of  markets for several periods. 
Market 1 included an additional step : 
4 .  Training with the uncertain clues about the s tate of the 
nature. 
Numbered file folders containing the instructions and record 
sheets were placed in widely separated seats in the classroom and 
the subj ects were invited into the room and asked to take any seat 
with a file folder on it  and to remember the number on their folder 
as their identification number. The experimenter led them through 
the file to identify various items in it. 
Step 1. Training with mechanism to draw the s tates of nature 
The subj ects were asked to read the first instruction sheet 
in the folder (Appendix A . l )  as the experimenter read these ins tructions 
aloud. On the table between the subj ects and the experimenter was kep t 
a six inch bingo cage with appropriate number of numbered balls. On 
the blackboard behind the experimenter Figure A. l had been drawn for 
experiment 1 (numbers were changed appropriately for o ther experiments) . 
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FIGURE A. l 
RANDOM DRAWING OF STATE OF TIIE NATURE 
x 
'\."")..']... 
36 Balls 
1-36 
y 
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After reading out the instructions, the experimenter pointed 
out the figure on the blackboard and explained that if the number on 
the ball drawn from the bingo cage is 12 or less ,  s tate of the nature 
X will be said to have been drawn; o therwise it will be Y. The 
experimenter rotated the bingo cage and drew a ball as all the subj ec ts 
watched, read out the number on the ball,  say 19 , and explained that 
s tate Y will be said to have been drawn. This procedure was repeated 
three times. While the subj ects could see the rotation of the bingo 
cage and the tumbling balls inside it ,  the numbers on the balls were 
too small for them to read . After the next draw had been made, the 
subj ects were asked to turn the page of the instructions and predict 
this draw by circling either X or Y. After everybody had recorded the 
prediction (verified by a research assistant) the experimenter revealed 
the number on the ball drawn and the resultant s tate of the nature.  
The subjects  recorded the outcome and their winnings/losses on  their 
respective sheets.  This procedure was repeated from ten to twenty 
times until most,  though not all , subj ects predicted the state with 
the highest relative frequency based on the bingo cage numbers. A 
research assistant walked around the room to glance at the predictions 
without talking to any subj ects. No mention was made of probabilities . 
Instructions was also drawn on the blackboard . While reading out 
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the trading and recording rules , the experimenter pointed out various 
columns and rows of the Information and Record Sheet where each 
transaction must be entered . 
The subj ects were asked to open the Zero-Period Information 
and Record Sheet in which initial endowment of one certificate and 
one million francs and X and Y dividends of 10 , 000 and 30,000 francs 
had been f illed in. The experimenter announced hypothetical bids,  
offers,  and transactions from a sheet prepared in advance and asked 
the involved subj ects to record the transaction in their Zero Period 
Information and Record Sheet as the experimenter recorded these 
transactions on the blackboard in the format shown in Figure A. 2. 
As each transaction was announced and recorded by the subj ects involved 
in that transaction, the research assis tant scrutinized the record 
sheets and corrected them as necessary . After all zero period 
transactions were complete, the subj ects were asked to calculate 
their net profit and the experimenter checked their profit calculations 
agains t the correct profit number from the prepared sheet. The 
subj ects  were told that it is important that all their records be 
accurate. 
Step 3 .  Conduct o f  Markets 
Step 2 .  Explanation of Procedures and Rules of the Market At the beginning of each period the experimenter announced 
The subjects were asked to read the second set of ins tructions 
(Appendix A. 2 )  in the file folder as the experimenter read these 
ins tructions aloud. Information and Record Sheet attached to the 
that he is drawing the s tate for the period , rotated the bingo cage 
in full view of all subjects and drew a bal l .  I n  markets 1 and 2 
(periods 1-4) and market 5 (periods 1-3)  the floor was immediately 
FIGURE A . 2 
ZERO PERIOD TRADING: HYPOTHETICAL TRANSACTIONS 
Bidder or Bid I Off er Off er er Buyer Price Price or Seller 
1 5 0 , 000 
I 
100 , 00 0  2 
3 � 
8 0 , 000 4 
5 
I 
6 1 , 000 
I 
9 0 , 00 0  7 
8 
1 
6 
7 
9 
� �  
2 
4 
� "-L_ 
1 2  
1 0  
______..r- � 
1 1  
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opened for trading. In market 1, period 11 the outcome of the bingo 
cage was publicly announced and the market was opened for trading . 
In all other periods of all markets the experimenter looked at the 
ball drawn and selected a set o f  prepared 3 by 5 clue cards . The set 
contained one numbered card for each subj ec t  with the information 
about the s tate drawn if that subj ect was to be informed that period and 
blank o therwise (see Figure A. 3) . A research assistant showed each 
subj ect ' s  clue card to him/her and collected the cards before the 
trading opened. The trading rules are given on pages 4-5 of  
Appendix A. 2. 
As each bid/offer was made, the experimenter recorded it 
on the blackboard in the format of  Figure A. 2 .  A research assistant 
kept an independent log on paper. When a subj ect accepted an 
outstanding bid or offer, the accep tance was recorded and circled . 
The research assistant kept the time and announced when two minutes 
and when thirty seconds of the allotted seven minutes remained in the 
trading period. At the end of the period , the experimenter announced 
the state of the nature, recorded it on the board and read out the 
completed transactions from the blackboard fQr each subj ect to recheck 
and correct ,  if necessary, their own trading record. The research 
assistant also checked his record against the blackboard . The subj ects 
calculated their net profit for the period and transferred it to the 
profit sheet. When all subj ects had completed their accounting , the 
experimenter announced that we were ready for the next perio d .  The 
trading record and the realized s tates of four to five periods remained 
on the blac�board at any one time. In market 5 ,  the research assistant ' s  
FIGURE A. 3 
EXAMPLES OF CLUE CARDS 
Trader 11 __ 
Clue Card 
x 
Trader II 
Clue Card 
For market 1 only 
Trader 11 __ _ 
Clue Card 
0 I 0 0 I 0 I 0 I 0 
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record of trading was photocopied and distributed to each subjec t  at 
the end of  the period . 
Step 4. Training with Uncertain Clues about the State of the Nature 
(Market 1 only) 
After following the above mentioned three-step procedure 
in the first four (no-information) periods in market 1, a fourth s tep 
was used to familiarize the subj ects with the sample evidence on the 
state of  the nature. The experimenter read out the instructions 
(Appendix A. 3) . In addition to the bingo cage used to draw the s tate 
of the nature (cage Z) two o ther cages marked X and Y were kept on
the table. " I" balls were white and the "O" balls were colored red 
so all subj ects could clearly see the number of balls of each color in 
each cage. Figure A. 4 was drawn on the blackboard to indicate the 
relative frequencies of "I"  and "O" balls from each cage . A ball was 
drawn from cage Z,  was identified as to state X or Y ,  and the experi­
menter drew ten balls with replacement from the appropriate clue cage . 
As each clue was drawn, it was recorded on the blackboard . This 
procedure was repeated four times to ensure that the subj ec ts understood 
how the clues they will later see are drawn. 
The subj ects were told that the clues listed on the sheet 
attached to the instructions were drawn using this procedure . The 
clues were drawn in advance of the experiment to save time . They were 
asked to make their prediction of the s tate of the nature that generated 
each clue and were informed of the actual state in sequence . After 
twenty- two prediction exercises , we returned to step 3 and started 
6 3  
period 5 of  market 1 distributing clue cards of the type shown at 
the bot tom of Figure A. 3 .  
At the end of the last period of each market experiment , 
the subj ects were asked to add their net profits on the Profit 
Sheet and to include the profits made from the predictions made in 
step 1 and 4 (if applicable) . They were asked to write down their 
name, social security number and the mailing address at the bottom 
of the Profit Sheet . If they wanted to participate in further 
experiments of this type, they were asked to add their phone number. 
With only a few exceptions , most subj ects indicated their willingness,  
even eagerness, to  participate in  further experiments. Each subject  
placed all  papers in the file folder and walked to  the table where 
the experimenter paid him/her the net profit indicated on the profit 
sheet in cash. 
In markets 3, 4 ,  and 5 the subj ects were given a question­
naire to fill out at the end of the last period (see Appendix A.4) 
and were paid $1 each for filling it out . 
Subj ects who participated in markets 1, 2 and 4 were 
inexperienced in that they had not participated in such an experiment 
before . Subj ects for markets 3 and 5 were experienced since they 
were drawn from the pool of subj ects who had participated in the 
earlier markets experiments . 
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FIGURE A . 4 
UNCERTAI N SAMPLE INFORMATION ON STATE OF THE NATURE 
Cage X 
1 0  Balls 
Cage Z State X ---
8 Os + 2 Is
3 6  Balls 
Cage Y 
1- 3 6  
10 Balls 
State Y ---
= 6 Os + 4 Is 
65 
APPENDIX A . l *  
INSTRUCTIONS 
Each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage containing thirty six 
balls numbered one through thirty six. If the ball drawn is numbered 
one through twelve , outcome of the draw is called X; if a ball  
numbered thirteen through thirty six  is  drawn, the outcome is  called Y .  
You have to  predict the outcome of each draw before it is announced . 
If your prediction is correct you win $0 . 2 5 ;  if wrong, you lose $0. 10.  
Before the first draw is made, record your prediction by circling 
either X or Y in the first row of the enclosed shee t .  After you 
have encircled one letter the outcome will be announced and you 
should record the announced outcome in the blank space on the same 
row of the table.  If your prediction is correct ,  circle the amount 
shown in the win column, otherwise circle the amount shown in the 
lose column. 
Once you have recorded your prediction you must not make a change ; 
any erasure will invalidate your prediction. At the end , add up 
your to tal winnings and losses and record the difference (net winnings 
or losses) at the bottom right corner of the shee t .  
*The numbers i n  paragraph 1 were altered appropriately for each
experiment . See Figure 2 for parameters. 
Number 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
1 3 .  
14 . 
1 5 .  
1 6 .  
1 7 .  
1 8. 
19. 
20 . 
Circle One 
Decision 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
x y 
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Subj ect No. 
Circle One 
Outcome Win Lose 
X or Y ( $) ($ )  
0 . 25 -0 . 10 
0 . 25 -0. 10 
0.25 -0 . 10 
0 . 25 -0 . 10 
0 . 25 -0 . 10 
0.25 -0 . 10 
0. 25 -0 . 1 0  
0 . 25 -0 . 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0 . 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 1 0  
0 . 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0. 25 -0 . 10 
0. 25 -0. 10 
0 . 25 -0. 10 
0 . 25 -0. 10 
Total winning 
Total losses 
Net winnings/losses 
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APPENDIX A .2  
( See page 72 for changes in  instructions across experiments . )  
INSTRUCTIONS 
General 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision­
making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this 
research. The instructions are simple , and if you follow them 
carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable 
amount of money which will be paid to you in cash . 
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in 
which you will buy and sell certificates in a sequence of market 
years . Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet,  labeled 
information and record sheet , which helps determine the value to 
you of any decisions you might make . You are not to reveal this 
information to anyone. It is your own private information. 
The type of currency used in this market is francs .  All 
trading and earnings will be in terms of francs . Each franc is 
worth 0 . 003 dollars to you . Do not reveal this number to anyone . 
At the end of the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars 
at this rate,  and you will be paid in dollars . Not ice that the 
more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn . 
Specific Instructions 
Your prof its come from two sources -- from collecting 
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certificate earnings on all certificates you hold at the end of  the 
year and from buying and selling certificates.  During each market 
year you are free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you 
wish, provided you follow the rules below . For each certificate you 
hold at the end of the year you will be given one of the two numbers 
of francs listed on row 19 of your information and record shee t .  
Note that earnings ma y  be different for different investors . 1 The 
method by which one of the two numbers is selected each year is 
explained later in these instructions . Compute your total certificate 
earnings for a period by mul tiplying the earnings per certificate 
by the number of certificates held . That is 
(number of certificates held) x (earnings per 
certificate) = total certificate earnings . 
Suppose for example that you hold five certificates at the end of  
year 1 .  If  for  that period your earnings are one hundred francs 
per certificate (that is, the number selected from row 19 is 100) 
then your total certificate earnings in the year would be 5 x 100 
500 francs .  This number should be recorded on row 1 9  at the end of  
the year . 
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs 
on hand by the amount of the sale price . Similarly , purchases reduce 
your francs on hand by the amount of the purchase price . Thus you 
can gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates . 
At the end of each year all your holdings are automatically sold to 
the experimenter at a price of 0 .  
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At  the beginning o f  each year you are provided with an 
initial holding of certificates . This is recorded on row 0 of the 
year ' s  information and record sheet . You may sell these if you wish 
or you may hold them. If you hold a certificate,  then you receive 
"earnings per certificate" at the end of the year . Notice therefore 
that for each certificate you hold initially you can earn during 
the year at least the amount shown as "earnings per certificate . "  
You earn this amount if you do not sell that certificate during the 
year . 
In addition, at the beginning of each year you are provided 
with an initial amount of francs on hand . This is also recorded on 
row 0 of each year ' s  information and record shee t .  You may keep 
this if you wish or you may use it to purchase certificates . 
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with 
holdings of certificates and francs on hand . You are free to buy 
and sell certificates as you wish according to the rules below .  
Your francs o n  hand at the end of a year are determined b y  your 
initial amount of francs on hand, earnings on certificate holdings 
at the end of the year and by gains and losses from purchases and 
sales of certificates. All francs on hand at the end of  a year in 
excess of 10, 000 francs are yours to keep . These are your profits 
for the year. 
Information about Dividends 
Whether the dividend you receive from the certificates you 
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hold is the X- dividend shown on row 19 or the Y- dividend on row 19 
is determined by the experimenter at the beginning of the year by 
drawing a ball from a bingo cage containing forty balls numbered 
one through forty. If the ball drawn is numbered one through sixteen , 
X-dividend is paid: if the ball drawn is numbered seventeen through 
2 forty, Y-dividend is paid . 
At the beginning of each year, before trading s tarts , each 
investor will receive a clue card which will carry one of the following 
three : 
x (i)  
(ii) y 
(III) a blank . 
If your clue card carries an X, the dividend paid at the end of that 
year will be the X-dividend; if your clue card carries a Y ,  Y-dividend 
will be paid.  A blank card tells you nothing about whether the X or 
3 the Y dividend will be pai d .  
Trading and Recording Rules 
(1) 
(2) 
All transactions are for one certificate at a time . After 
each of your sales or purchases you must record the TRANSACTION 
PRICE in the appropriate column depending on the nature of  
the transaction.  The f irst transaction is  recorded on row (1)  
and succeeding transactions are recorded on subsequent rows . 
After each transaction you must calculate and record your new 
holdings of  certificates and your new francs on hand . Your 
holdings of certificates may never go below zero . Your francs 
on hand may never go below zero . 
(3)  
(4) 
71 
At the end of the year record your total certificate earnings 
in the last column of row 19 . Compute your end of period 
totals on row 20 by listing certificate holdings and adding 
total certificate earnings to your francs on hand . 
At the end o f  the year , subtract from your francs on hand the 
amount listed in row 21 and enter this new amount on row 22 . 
This is your profit for the market year and is yours to keep . 
At the end of each market year, record this number on your profit 
sheet. 
(5)  At the end of  the experiment add up your total profit on  your 
profit sheet and enter this sum on row 15 of your profit sheet . 
To convert this number into dollars , multiply by the number on 
row 16 and record the product on row 17 . The experimenter will 
pay you this amount o f  money . 
Market Organization 
The market for these certificates is organized as follows . 
The market will be conducted in a series of years . Each period lasts 
for seven minutes.  Anyone wishing to purchase a certificate is free 
to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one certificate 
at a specified price , and anyone with certificates to sell is free to 
accept or not accept the bid.  Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a 
certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer 
to sell one certificate at a specified price . If a bid or offer is 
accepted , a binding contract has been closed for a single certificate, 
and the contracting parties will record the transaction on their 
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information and record sheets.  Any ties in b ids or acceptance will 
be resolved by random choice . Except for the bids and their acceptance , 
you are not to speak to any other subj ect . There are likely to be 
many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying . 
You are free to make as much profit as you can . 
1 .  In instructions for market 2 ,  this sentence was eliminated . In 
market 1, it had been replaced by "Notice that these a100unts may 
differ from period to period. " 
2 .  States and numbers in this paragraph were altered according to 
parameters for each experiment given in Figure 2 .  
3 .  This paragraph describing the clue cards was not used in markets 
1 and 2 and was altered to include state Z in market 5 .
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 
X-Dividend 
Y-Dividend 
Trans-
ac tion 
Number 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13  
14 
15 
16 
1 7  
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Trader If 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
YEAR ----
Transaction Price Certifi-
cates on Francs on 
Sale Purchase Hand Hand 
/ / /l/ / / / / / / / / / / / / /l / / / / / / /ll/ 
/ / / /ll! /l / / / / / / / / / / / / /l /I////  
Total Certificate Earnings 
Dividend Rate 
on Hand at the End of the Year 
Total Francs on Hand at the End 
of the Year 
Less : Fix<!d Cost 
End of Year Net Profit 
Transfer this amount �] 
to your Profit Sheet 
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' Beginning of the
Year Holdings 
X-Dividend 10, 00 D 
Y-Dividend 30, 00 0 
Trans-
action 
Number 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1  
12 
13 
14 
15  
16 
1 7  
1 8  
19 
20 
21 
22  
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET 
YEAR 0 
Transaction Price 
Sale Purchase 
! ! lll // l l// l l l/ /l l/ !l///ll //I  "!ll /// l/ / / /l/ / / // / / /l / / I / / / / /  
Trader ff 
Certifi-
cates on 
Hand 
1 
Total Certificate Earnings 
Dividend Rate 
on Hand at the End of the Year 
Total Francs on Hand at the End 
of the Year 
Less :  Fix.?d Co st 
Francs on 
Hand 
1 , 000 , 000 
1 , 000, 000 
End of Year Net Profit 
Trans fer this amount �J 
to your Profit Sheet 
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-�----.. 
Trader 1F 
----
PROF IT SHEET 
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Market 
Row Year Profit 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
1 0  1 0  
1 1  1 1  
1 2  12 
1 3  1 3  
14 14 
15 Total Profit ( in Franc s )  
1 6  Dollars Per Franc 0. 0 0 3
1 7  Total Dollars Profit 
NAME 
������������������� 
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APPENDIX A. 3 
INSTRUCTIONS 
As you know, each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage 
( let us call it Cage Z) containing thirty-six balls numbered one through
thirty-six. If the ball drawn is numbered one through twelve , X-
dividend is paid, if a ball numbered thirteen through thirty-six is 
drawn, Y-dividend is paid .  
If the ball drawn from Cage Z i s  numbered one through
twelve, we go to another bingo cage called Cage X, containing two 
balls marked I and eight balls marked 0 .  Ten balls are drawn from 
this cage, one at a time with replacement . Similarly, if the ball 
drawn from bingo Cage Z is numbered thirteen through thirty-six, we 
go to a third bingo Cage Y containing four balls marked I and six balls 
marked 0. Again ten balls are drawn , one at a time with replacement 
from this cage . 
Markings on the ten balls drawn from X or Y cages are written 
down in sequence . A sequence might look like .! Q Q .! .! .Q. Q .Q. .! .!, which
means that the first ball drawn was marked I, the second 0 and so on . 
This sequence constitutes your clue . The enclosed sheet is intended 
to help you get used to identifying whether the clue came from X or 
Y cage . For each clue shown, you have to record your guess of whether 
it came from X or Y cage by encircl ing X or Y on the row. After you 
have encircled one letter, the correct cage will be revealed . You 
should then record your wins and losses . Do not erase your guess 
af ter it is made since any erasure invalidates the guess . 
RECORD SHEET 
Period 
1 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27  
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
- - - - - - - - - -
0 0 I 0 I I 0 0 0 I 
I 0 I I 0 0 I ·O I 0 - - - - - - - - - -
I I 0 0 0 I I I I 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 0 I 0 0 I I 0 0 I - - - - - - - - - -
I 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 I - - - - - - - - - -
I 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
I I 0 I 0 0 I I 0 0 
0 0 I 0 0 I 0 0 I 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 I 0 0 I I I I I I - - - - - - - - - -
0 I 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 0 0 0 0 0 I I 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 I 0 I I 0 0 I 0 0 
I 0 I I 0 0 0 I 0 I - - - - - - - - - -
! 0 0 I 0 0 0 I 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I I - - - - - - - - - -
0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 0 I 0 I 0 0 0 0 I - - - - - - - - - -
0 0 0 I I 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - - - -
0 I 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Q Q .! Q Q Q Q Q .Q. 1.
0 I 0 0 0 I I 0 I 0 - - - - - - - - - -
Events 
Circle One 
x y 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
.x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
y 
Actual Event 
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Circle one 
Win or Lose 
( Cents ) 
25 -10 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
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Trader II 
APPENDIX A . 4  
MARKET 3 :  POST-EXPERIMENT DEBRIEFING 
Please answer the questions below. For every correct answer you get 
$0 . 10;  for every incorrect answer you lose $0 . 05 . 
1 .  Indicate with a check mark the investors who received blanck/ 
nonblank clue cards in the years��- to of  the experiment . 
Investor 
1 .  
2 .  
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
10 . 
11. 
12. 
Blank Nonblank 
2 .  Indicate in the table below the X and Y dividends o f  o ther investors . 
Investor 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4 .  
5 .  
6 .  
7 .  
8 .  
9 .  
10. 
11. 
12 . 
x y 
3 .  Indicate in the table below the maximum and minimum dividends paid 
under X and Y .  
Maximum Dividend 
Minimum Dividend 
Number of Correct Answers 
Net Profit�����-
State X State Y 
Number o f  Incorrect Answers 
Trader II 
MARKET 4 :  POST-EXPERIMENT DEBRIEFING 
Please answer the questions below. For every correct answer you get 
$0 . 10 ;  for every incorrect answer you lose $0 . 05 .  
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1 .  In years ��- through ��-' some of the traders knew the state 
before the trading began ( i . e . , they received nonblank clue cards) , 
while the other traders did not know the state ( i . e . ,  received 
blank clue cards ) . Rank all o ther 11 traders from most likely to 
be informed (1) to leas t likely to be informed (11) . Cross out 
your own trader number . 
Trader II 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Rank 
2. How many traders were informed during the period mentioned in
question l ?
3 .  Indicate i n  the table below the maximum and minimum dividends paid 
under states X and Y. 
State X State Y 
Maxi=m Dividond [ I I Minimum Dividend 
4 .  In case you always received a blank clue card , were you able  to figure 
out what the state was from trading? If so ,  how did you learn bhe 
state? 
Number of correct answers Number o f  incorrect answers ��-
Net profit _  _ 
Trader fl 
MARKET 5 :  POST-EXPERIMENT DEBRIEFING 
Please answer the questions below. For every correct answer you get 
$0 . 10 ;  for every incorrect answer you lose $0 .05 . 
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1 .  In years ��- through ��-' some o f  the traders knew the s tate 
before the trading began (i . e . , they received nonblank clue cards ) , 
while other traders did not know the state (i . e . , received blank 
clue cards) . Rank all other 11 traders from most likely to be
informed (1) to least likely to be informed (11) . Cross out your 
own trader number . 
Trader II 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Rank 
2 .  How many traders were informed during the period mentioned in 
question 1 ?  
3 .  Indicate in the table below the maximum and minimum dividends paid 
under states X and Y .  
State X 
Maximom Dividend ! I Minimum Dividend I 
State Y 
"AR KET 
YEAR 
8 . N .  Buye r Se l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i c e  
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
' 
7 
• 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
l J  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
21 
22 
2J 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
J I  
J 2  
3J 
.l4 
�i 5 
36 
J 7  
J8 
l9 
40 
4 1  
4 2 
4 J  
4 4  
45 
4 6  
4 7  
4 8  
4 9  
50 
51 
52 
53 
2 
2 
5 
5 
8 
J 
8 
8 
7 
7 
7 
9 
9 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
4 
5 
1 
2 
4 
4 
8 
1 
5 
1 
4 
1 
1 
8 
5 
8 
1 
8 
8 
J 
9 
2 
2 
1 
7 
4 
6 
9 
6 
4 
4 
J 
8 
8 
7 
7 
9 
9 
3 
2 
J 
3 
2 
2 
7 
4 
4 
9 
50 
200 
250 
275 
2 4 0  
2 5 0  
1 80 
225 
200 
2 1 0  
200 
200 
225 
200 
2 2 �  
24 0 
200 
2 1 0  
2 1 0  
250 
200 
200 
2 1 0  
225 
JOO 
285 
1 9 0  
2 7 5  
250 
200 
250 
250 
260 
250 
260 
250 
275 
285 
250 
225 
200 
2 1 0  
250 
200 
200 
250 
250 
2 4 0  
2�0 
260 
250 
250 
225 
YEAR 2 
APPENDIX B 
B ID S ,  OFFERS , PRICES 
4 265 B . N ,  Buver S e l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i c• 
57 
!59 
59 
60 
6 1  
6 2  
6 3  
2 295 
2 
9 
4 
5 
5 
3 
2 2 5  
2 4 0  
250 
280 
6 250 
3 290 
9 
9 
7 
2 
7 
270 
260 
YEAR 3 
29!5 
270 
260 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
8 
2 
225 S , N ,  Buv • r  S• l l • r  B i d  O f f e r  P r ic•
10 
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
31 
32 
J 3  
34 
35 
36 
3 7  
38 
39 
40 
4 1  
4 2  
43  
4 4  
4 5  
4 6  
4 7  
4 9  
4 9  
s o  
5 
5 
9 
1 
2 
2 
8 
9 
1 
2 
2 
8 
9 
1 
!5 
5 
2 
6 
1 
l 
8 
4 
6 
5 
5 
2 
6 
4 
250 
3 260 
2!55 
6 255 
3 265 
3 265 
2 1 5  
7 27!5 
250 
3 270 
255 
260 
9 260 
250 
3 270 
25!5 
7 2!55 
4 26!5 
260 
3 260 
255 
260 
4 260 
260 
7 280 
270 
2 275 
2 275 
7 280 
270 
2 7 5  
7 275 
260 
265 
270 
2 280 
275 
8 275 
7 
2l10 
2!50 
255 
260 
260 
51 5 290 
52 6 270 
53 
5 4  
5 5  
5 6  
6 
5 
1 
9 
9 
255 
260 
2 7 5  
2 7 5  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
l J  
1 4  
1 !5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 9  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3 1  
32 
33 
34 
JS 
36 
37 
38 
3 9  
40 
4 1  
42 
4 3  
4 4  
45 
46 
47 
4 250 
J 295 0 255 
4 260 
4 
2 
2 
2 
9 
9 
2 
3 
l 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
5 
4 
7 
2 
3 
9 
3 
7 
4 
6 
3 
9 
2 
9 
8 
255 
260 
250 
250 
255 
2 6 0  
2 5 5  
2 6 0  
265 
260 
265 
260 
265 
4 270 
275 
270 
275 
2 70 
2 290 0 2 1 1  
4 2 7 5  
4 
8 
1 
6 
9 
4 
8 
2 
8 
4 
4 
4 
8 
3 
2 
J 
3 
5 
5 
7 
2 70 
275 
2 6 5  
2 7 0  
275 
275 
280 
260 
2 70 
2 8 5  
2 fJ O  
2 8 0  
2 6 0  
260 
250 
260 
265 
270 
2 7 5  
2 8 0  
290 
280 
48 
49 
!50 
5 1  
5 2  
5 3  
5 4  
!5 5  
5 6  
57 
!58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
6 3  
6 4  
65 
9 
4 
4 
9 
a 
4 
7 
l 
9 
4 
4 
2 
9 
9 
2 
5 
2 
8 
9 
2 
7 
81 
275 
270 
275 
280 
27!5 
265 
275 
290 
YEAR 4 
285 
290 
29!5 
290 
295 
295 
290 
290 
295 
290 
8 . N .  &..iw•r S• l l • r  Bid Off•r P r i c• 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
9 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4 
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
:�4 
2 5  
2 6  
27 
28 
29 
30 
3 1  
32 
J3 
34 
35 
36 
9 
9 
9 
2 
J 
B 
1 
1 
3 
8 
5 
8 
6 
6 
8 
8 
9 
2 
4 
J 
9 
2 
a 
2 
4 
1 
4 290 
270 
J 29!5 
4 280 
275 
7 275 
260 
265 
4 290 
270 
275 
4 275 
260 
265 
270 
275 
J 295 
280 
275 
2 285 
290 
290 
5 290 
3 295 
260 
265 
2 70 
27!5 
J 290 
J 280 
275 
B 295 
J 280 
J 290 
260 
265 
J 7  
J B  
J9 
'40 
4 1  
'4 2  
4J 
4 4  
45 
4 6  
4 7  
4 8  
4 9  
5 0  
5 1  
5 2  
S J  
5 4  
5 5  
56 
57 
58 
S . N .  
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 J  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
2J 
24 
25 
26 
27 
2 8  
2 9  
.rn 
3 1  
32 
33 
34 
3'.) 
J6 
37 .  
4 
2 
7 
7 
9 
9 
270 
275 
2 8 0  
2 7 5  
2 280 
JOO 
8 295 
7 
7 
9 
8 
1 
4 
5 
2 
2 
4 
9 
4 
9 
295 
290 
250 
260 
275 
280 
1 260 
4 265 
290 
:? 8 5  
8 2 8 0  
YEAR 5 
290 
285 
280 
290 
Buye r S e l l e r  Bid O f f e r  P r i c e  
2 260 
3 3 1 0  
7 300 
4 275 
4 
2 2 8 5  
2 
3 3 1 0  
8 300 
4 2 6 0  
1 265 
9 295 
8 270 
4 275 
6 280 
4 
7 
3 
3 
1 
8 
6 
6 
285 
290 
300 
2 9 5  
290 
2 300 
4 280 
2 
2 
8 2 9 5  
9 
J 
265 
300 
2 I 280 
285 
290 
290 
285 
2 280 
4 
3 
7 
7 
� 285 
5 
8 
8 
275 
2El5 
290 
4 2 8 5  
3 290 
285 
:•90 
J B  
39 
40 
" 1  
4 2  
'1 3  
4 4  
4 5  
'1 6  
4 7  
48 
49 
50 
5 1  
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
SB 
S9 
60 
61 
62 
6 3  
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
7 4  
7S 
76 
286 1 
4 3 290 
2 295 
5 290 
280 
265 
4 
3 
3 
4 
9 285 
280 
3 290 
8 
4 
3 290 
285 
7 290 
7 290 
" 285 
8 295 
290 4 
4 
3 
5 290 
4 
280 
2 295 
285 
6 2 9 0  
4 
3 
4 
6 290 
280 
285 
2 
0 290 
8 7 
4 290 
2 
4 2 
3 280 
8 
4 290 
4 0 
4 295 
7 295 
8 
7 0 
1 290 
YEAR 6 
295 
290 
295 
295 
295 
295 
300 
300 
S . N .  Buwer S e l l e r  B i d  Offe r P r i c e  
4 3 1 0  
2 3 305 
3 8 275 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
3 
9 
3 
I 
6 
6 
8 
5 
4 
2 
" 
4 
2 
7 
2 
1 
1 
J 
280 
285 
280 
285 
290 
285 
300 
295 
290 
295 
295 
:•90 
JOO 
290 
290 
290 
2 0  
2 1  
2 2  
23 
24 
25 
2 6  
27 
29 
29 
30 
3 1  
32 
JJ 
34 
35 
36 
J7 
JB 
J9 
40 
4 1  
4 2  
'43 
4 4  
45 
4 6  
4 7  
4 8  
4 9  
5 0  
5 1  
52 
5J 
54 
55 
56 
S7 
58 
59 
8 
4 
1 
1 
8 
1 
4 
8 
6 
6 
e 
e 
3 
1 
1 
e 
2 
1 
J 
8 
8 
J 
290 
295 
9 295 
290 
2 290 
295 
3 
9 
2 9 S  
9 
290 
290 
290 
285 
3 2 9 5  
2 9 0  
3 290 
3 300 
4 295 
290 
3 290 
4 295 
295 
290 
7 290 
4 295 
285 
9 2 9 0  
2 9 6  
9 290 
" 290 
280 
285 
4 
280 
285 
2 285 
1 
5 
B 
5 B 
5 290 
2 
5 2 
YE�R 7 
300 
295 
290 
295 
290 
290 
S . N .  Buwe r Se l l e r  B i d  Offer P r i c e  
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 J  
1 '1  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
4 
2 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
4 
4 
4 
8 
7 
4 
2 
9 
3 
B 
9 
B 
5 
3 
3 
5 
5 
280 
285 
290 
290 
295 
295 
290 
295 
290 
295 
3 1 0  
3 0 5  
300 
305 
300 
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1 7 0  
1 70 
l B O  
l BO 
1 BO 
l B O  
l B S  
1 90 
1 9 5  
2 0 0  
2 0 0  
2 0 5  
2 1 0  
2 2 5  
230 
250 
250 
2BO 
250 
255 
260 
2BO 
2BO 
2BO 
2BO 
200 
200 
280 
290 
285 
3 2BO 
J 
7 
J 
3 
3 
3 
J 
7 284 
1 
3 
1 l  
1 l  
1 2  
1 2  
7 
7 
1 0  
1 
7 
2BO 
280 
2BO 
2 70 
2 75 
2BO 
2 9 0  
285 
1 70 
1 70 
1 80 
l BO 
1 80 
200 
200 
2BO 
280 
280 
280 
2BO 
280 
280 
270 
2 7 5  
2 8 0  
2 8 0  
60 
6 1  
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
6B 
69 
70 
7 1  
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
7B 
79 
BO 
3 7 
3 2 8 0  
J 
9 280 
9 
J 280 
10 
J 1 0  
J 2 8 0  
9 2 8 5  
J 290 
J JOO 
J 325 
J 3SO 
J J60 
J 2 
9 280 
J JOO 
9 J20 
J 3SO 
3 360 
¥-EAR 7 
280 
280 
280 
285 
285 
360 
S . N .  BuYer Se l l e r  Bid Offer P r i ce 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2 
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
2 2  
2 J  
2 <1  
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
3 1  
3 2  
J J  
34 
35 
J6 
37 
J 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
1 1  
1 1  
5 
5 
5 
5 
8 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
7 
l 
9 
1 
7 
8 
9 
7 
9 
8 
B 
9 
1 
1 
9 
7 
J 
3 
9 
9 
2 
2 
1 2  
4 
3 
3 
1 5 0  
1 6 0  
1 5 5 
1 50 
1 5 5  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 5 0  
1 5 5  
1 60 
300 
250 
200 
1 90 
1 B O  
l / S 
1 7 0 
1 70 
1 60 
1 6 0  
1 5 5  
160 
160 
1 60 
1 65 
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 5 5  
1 5 5  
1 5 5  
1 60 
1 60 
1 60 
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
J8 
J9 
40 
4 1  
4 2  
<I J  
4 4  
45 
<1 6  
4 7  
<1 8  
49 
so 
51 
52 
53 
54 
S S  
S6 
57 
SB 
S9 
60 
61 
62 
8 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
9 
2 
5 
5 
9 
5 
5 
5 
5 
1 1  
5 
5 
1 50 
1 5 5  
1 60 
1 2  1 6 0  
1 60 
1 0  1 80 
B 1 70 
1 0  1 6 5  
8 1 6 0  
1 50 
1 5 5  
1 60 
4 1 60 
1 5 5  
1 6 0  
1 0  1 7 0  
10 1 6 5  
1 0  1 65 
1 6 5  
2 1 70 
2 1 70 
1 55 
! 6 0  
1 0  1 70 
1 0  1 70 
YEAR 8 
S . N .  Buw• r Se l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i ce 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 l  
1 2  
1 J  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
2 J  
2 4  
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
3 1  
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2 
5 
2 
5 
5 
5 
1 0  JOO 
8 200 
9 1 90 
3 1 80 
1 5 0  
1 5 5  
3 1 70 
7 1 6 5  
J 1 6 2  
1 60 
1 5 5  
7 1 65 
3 1 60 
J 
9 1 65 
1 6 0  
9 
1 6 0  
1 
1 6 0  
3 
7 1 6 5  
1 6 0  
7 
1 0  1 70 
1 6 0  
1 65 
9 
7 1 70 
1 65 
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 60 
1 6 5  
1 6 5  
32 
J J  
J4 
35 
J6 
]7 
3B 
]9 
<10 
<11 
4 2  
4 3  
4 4  
4 5  
46 
4 7  
4 B  
<1 9  
5 0  
5 1  
52 
5J 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
5 
8 
2 
5 
5 
5 
8 
1 1  
5 
5 
B 
2 
1 1  
5 
5 
5 
5 
9 2  
1 0  
1 0  
7 
1 2  
7 
7 
2 
2 .
2 
4 
8 
1 0  
1 0  
2 
8 
1 5 0  
1 5 5  
1 65 
1 65 
1 6 0  
1 65 
150 
1 5 5  
1 60 
165 
1 70 
1 70 
YEAR 9 
161 
1 70 
1 70 
1 75 
1 70 
1 85 
1 75 
1 7J 
180 
1 75 
165 
1 6 5  
1 70 
1 70 
1 70 
S . N ,  Buwer Se l l • r  B i d  Off•r P r i ce 
1 
2 
J 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1'' 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
J 
9 
7 
7 
J 
9 
4 
9 
J 
J 
3 
9 
3 
J 
J 
J 
1 
1 1  
1 1  
8 
8 
2 
2 
8 
8 
5 
5 
7 
5 
1 1  
1 1  
7 
1 
1 
1 2  
4 
1 2  
5 
1 50 
1 6 0  
2 5 0  
2 5 5  
2 6 0  
JOO 
JOO 
280 
270 
250 
270 
275 
JOO 
J 2 0  
3 1 0  
JOO 
J25 
JOO 
J25 
JlO 
2 7 0  
250 
270 
275 
JOO 
JOO 
JOO 
JOO 
]00 
JO 
J 1  
J2 
J J  
J4 
J5 
J6 
J 7  
J 8  
J9 
40 
'1 1  
4 2  
4 J  
4 "  
45 
'16 
4 7  
48 
'19 
50 
5 1  
5 2  
5 3  
5 4  
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
6 1  
6 2  
6 3  
64 
65 
6 6  
67 
68 
' 
9 
J 
9 
J 
9 
J 
J 
3 
3 
9 
9 
3 
9 
7 
1 2  
7 
1 
1 
7 
1 0  
7 
7 
2 
7 
4 
2 
7 
1 0 
3 J O  
7 
J 
7 
3 7 
3 
3 7 
1 2  
9 1 2  
3 
1 0 
9 1 0  
3 
3 
9 
J 
YEAR 
JOO 
300 
J05 
3 1 0  
3 1 0  
. H O  
3 1 0  
3 1 2  
J 1 5  
320 
3 20 
3 2 5  
3 J O  
3 3 5  
3 4 0  
1 0  
J I O  
J 25 
J 1 0  
J 2 0  
J 1 5  
J 1 0  
J 1 5 
320 
3 1 5  
J20 
J 1 9 
320 
3 2 5  
JOO 
J 1 0 
3 1 0  
3 1 0  
J 1 0  
3 1 0 
3 1 5  
3 1 9 
320 
320 
J25 
S . N ,  Buwer S• l l • r  Bid Offe r P r i c• 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 'I 
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22  
2 3  
24 
2 5  
1 1  
1 1  
2 
5 
5 
8 
5 
2 
5 
5 
J 
2 
5 
3 
1 
4 
9 
4 
7 
J 
4 
9 
7 
1 0  
9 
3 
1 50 
1 50 
1 60 
1 50 
1 60 
1 65 
1 60 
1 65 
1 5 5  
1 60 
3 1 0  
250 
180 
1 75 
1 70 
1 75 
1 70 
1 80 
1 70 
1 70 
1 65 
1 50 
1 60 
1 6 5  
1 65 
26 5 2 7 
28 1 
2 9  5 
30 
3 1  
32 1 
J3 2 
J4 
35 5 
J6 
J7 0 
38 1 
3 9  5 
4 0  5 
4 1  
4 2  
'1 3  2 
4 '1  
4 5  5 
'16 1 1  
"7 2 
48 
<19 0 
50 2 
5 1  
5 2  5 
5 3  1 1  
54 2 
55 
56 
57 2 
58 5 
59 
60 0 
6 1  l l  
62 1 1  
6 3  
6 4  5 
65 
6 6  5 
67 
6 8  5 
69 5 
70 0 
71 5 
72 
73 
J 1 65 
9 1 70 
1 65 
9 1 70 
2 1 8 0  
7 1 75 
1 60 
1 65 
7 1 7 0  
7 1 70 2 1 75 
1 60 
1 65 
1 70 
2 1 7 0  
9 1 8 0 
7 1 7 5  
1 6 5  
9 
9 
1 7 0  
1 50 
1 7 0  
1 5 5  
7 1 75 
1 6 0  
1 6 5 
1 1 70 
1 1 7 0  
1 60 
1 65 
7 1 75 
1 1 70 
1 68 
1 1 7 0  
7 1 75 
1 65 
� 
J 1 70 
7 1 75 
1 70 
1 0  1 72 
7 1 70 
1 2  1 75 
1 70 
1 2  1 70 
1 0  
1 0  
1 70 
1 72 
YEAR 1 1  
1 80 
1 75 
S . N .  Buwer Se l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i ce 
2 
3 
... 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3 
1 4  
3 
9 
9 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
9 
9 
5 
2 
1 0  
8 
8 
2 
5 
1 1  
1 60 
1 70 
250 
300 
300 
305 
J20 
3 1 0  
300 
280 
2 8 0  
3 0 0  
3 0 0  
305 
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
Iii 
1 9 
20 
2 1  
22 
2J 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
3 1  
32 
3J 
34 
35 
36 
3 7  
3 8  
3 9  
40 
4 1  
4 2  
'1 3  
4 4  
4 �  
'46 
4 /  
4 FJ  
•l'I 
�.iO
51
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
6 1  
6 2  
63 
64 
6S 
66 
6 7  
6 8  
6 9  
1 0  
J 
J 
9 
9 
3 
3 
9 
9 
3 
J 
9 
3 
J 
J 
9 
9 
J 
J 
J 
J 
9 
9 
J 
J 
j 
J 
�· 
.s 
9 
3 
9 
9 
9 
3 
9 
J 
J 
9 
I 
4 
5 
5 
1 
7 
5 
7 
4 
7 
2 
1 
2 
1 0 
1 2  
7 
7 
1 :! 
1 :! 
1 0  
10  
1 2  
1 1  
1 1  
6 
1 2  
305 
305 
305 
3 1 0 
3 1 0 
3 1 0  
320 
J 1 5  
320 
320 
320 
320 
J20 
325 
.J�� � ... 
.HO 
335 
340 
.J50 
355 
360 
365 
J65 
9 J70 
9 1 2  
9 .1110 
9 .J70 
9 6 
J 3 70 
YEAR 1 2  
] 1 0  
JJO 
320 
320 
325 
.J�;O 
.!.Ju 
.no 
3 ... 0 
375 
370 
3 75 
305 
305 
3 1 0  
3 1 0  
31 0 
320 
320 
320 
320 
320 
3:;?5 
..:� .'.•J 
340 
350 
365 
370 
370 
8 , N ,  Buw•r S• l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r 1 c• 
1 
2 
3 
... 
5 
6 
7 
7 
II 
9 
1 
y 
9 
1 50 
1 60 
1 65 
�00 
l YO 
1 80 
1 70 
.. . ,  
9 1 
10 
1 1 
1 2  1 0  
l l  1 
1 4  
1 5  
u 
1 7  
18 
1 9 
20 2 
21 1 
22 
2l 2 
2 ... 
25 2 
26 
21 5 
28 
:.!9 5 
JO 
3 1  5 
J2 
JJ 5 
]4 1 1  
]5 
]6 
3 1  5 
JI 5 
39 
40 
"' 1  I 
42 I 
"'3 
...... s 
"'5 s 
"'6 I 
... 7 
41 II 
"'' 
50 2 
51 I 
52 5 
53 5 
54 I 
55 
56 9 
57 5 
51 • 
59 I 
60 
61 1 1  
62 
63 ' 
6"' I 
65 
66 I 
67 
68 5 
69 5 
70 5 
7! 
93 
¥ 1 /� 
1 10 
9 lWO 
2 1 /5 
2 1 75 
1 70 
2 1 80 
... 1 75 
4 1 75 
9 1 1:15 
5 1 80 
7 1 15 
1 70 
7 1 75 
5 1 110 
1 70 
7 1 75 
J 1 7 0  
7 1 75 
1 70 
2 1 7 3  
3 1 70 
2 1 75 
1 70 
2 1 73 
4 1 70 
1 70 
I 180 
2 1 75 
1 72 
2 172 
9 1 80 
7 1 75 
1 70 
.. 170 
.., 1 75 
1 70 
9 1 70 
1 65 
1 1 80 
1 70 
7 
1 
1 75 
1 60 
170 
1 70 
7 170 
1 65 
12 175 
170 
l 1 70 
170 
10 1 70 
2 175 
2 1 75 
12 175 
1 70 
I 170 
1 2  1 70 
1 2  1 70 
1 0  1 7:1 
1 70 
10  1 70 
1 70 
8 1 80 
YEAR 1 J  
S . N .  Bu�• r S • l l • r  B i d  O f f • r  P r i c• 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 "  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
2 7  
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
3 5 
36 
3 7  
38 
39 
40 
4 1  
"4 2  
43 
44 
45 
46 
4 7  
4 8  
49 
50 
51 
52 
SJ 
5 '1  
5 5  
5 6  
5 7  
5 8  
5 9  
60 
6 1  
9 
7 
3 
9 
3 
1 
9 
7 
3 
9 
9 
3 
9 
9 
3 
3 
3 
9 
9 
3 
9 
7 
3 
3 
9 
9 
9 
9 
3 
9 
3 
3 
9 
3 
3 
9 
3 
3 
J 
200 
250 
300 
8 500 
2 4 5 0  
4 3 5 0  
5 3 4 0  
305 
4 3 1 0  
4 
8 320 
8 
2 330 
3 1 0  
2 320 
2 
1 0  
5 
4 
8 
7 
B 
1 
7 
7 
5 
2 
2 
5 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 1  
1 1  
7 
320 
325 
325 
3 3 0  
3 3 0  
3 2 5  
3 3 0  
330 
330 
J 3 5  
3 4 0  
3 4 0  
3 4 0  
3 4 0  
3 4 S  
3 4 0  
3 4 5  
345 
350 
350 
350 
340 
350 
340 
350 
3 4 5  
3 4 5  
3 4 5  
350 
3 4 5  
3 7 0  
360 
370 
3 1 0  
320 
320 
325 
330 
330 
330 
340 
340 
3 4 0  
3 4 0  
3 4 5  
3 -4 5  
3 4 5  
350 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
BO 
8 1  
82 
83 
B-4 
8 5  
' 
3 
9 
9 
9 
3 
3 
9 
9 
3 
3 
3 
9 
3 
3 
3 
360 
355 
360 
1 2  380 
1 1  370 
365 
360 
7 365 
365 
1 1  365 
365 
1 2  3 75 
1 0  370 
1 0  370 
1 2  375 
370 
12 370 
1 2  380 
1 2  
1 2  
370 
372 
373 
373 
YEAR 1 4  
375 
373 
S . N .  Bu�e r S e l l e r  Bid Offer P r i c e  
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
20 
2 1  
2 2  
2 3  
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
10 
3 
2 
2 
9 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 0  
1 0  
9 
9 
1 
2 
2 
"' 
-+· 
4 
1 1  
1 1  
3 
5 
5 
2 
3 
3 
1 1  
1 1  
5 
5 
4 
9 
4 
4 
9 
2 
1 30 
1 4 0 
1 4 5  
1 50 
1 55 
1 60 
1 6 5  
1 6 5  
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 5 0  
1 55 
250 
180 
1 7S 
1 70 
1 70 
1 7 0  
1 65 
1 70 
1 6 5  
1 6 5  
1 6S 
1 70 
1 6 5 
1 6 0  
1 6 5  
1 60 
1 7 0  
1 70 
1 65 
1 6 5  
1 6S 
1 6 0  
1 S5 
36 
37 1 0  
38 
39 7 
40 
4 1  3 
4 2  3 
4 3 
4 4  
4 5  2 
46 
4 7  
4 8  
4 9  
5 0  
S l  
5 2  
S3 
54 
SS 
56 
57 
S8 
3 
2 
J 
1 
Ml\Rlfr I 5 
8 
8 
9 
9 
2 
B 
B 
9 
9 
1 2  
1 0  
1 2  
1 2  
7 
7 
2 
9 
1 0  
YEAR 
1 4 5  
1 50 
1 50 
1 5 0  
1 55 
150 
1 S S  
1 6 0 
1 5 �  
l S O  
1 6 5  
1 6 0  
1 5 5  
1 55 
1 6 5  
1 60 
1 5 5  
1 5 0  
1 S O  
1 5 S  
1 50 
1 5 5  
1 5 5  
S , N ,  Bu�e r Se l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i ce 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
1 0  
1 1  
12 
1 3  
1 4  
1 5  
1 6  
1 7  
1 8  
1 9  
1 2  
1 1  
7 
2 
1 1  
3 
B 
1 1  
9 
6 
9 
9 
1 2  
1 2  
1 1  
1 1  
3 
1 1  
1 2  
1 1  
3 
1 1  
1 0 0  
1 1 0 
1 1 0 
1 2 0 
1 2 5  
1 3 0  
1 5 0 
1 5 5  
1 60 
20 6 1 50 
1 50 
200 
200 
1 90 
1 75 
1 70 
1 70 
2 1  1 2  1 6 0  
2 2  7 
23 
1 2  
1 1  1 70 
1 50 
200 
1 60 
1 60 
94 
2 4  ' 1 60 
25 ' 10 1 60 
26 1 1 65 
2 7  ' 1 60 
2 8  6 J 1 6 0  
2 9  e 1 50 
30 6 1 6 0  
31 1 1  1 70 
32 6 1 1 6 0  
33 1 2  1 50 
34 1 1  1 70 
35 8 1 5 5  
3 6  1 1 65 
37 9 1 1 65 
3 8  8 160 
3 9  4 1 6 5  
40 4 1 0  165 
4 1  9 1 6 5  
4 2  1 1  1 70 
4 3  9 1 1  1 70 
44 B 1 65 
YEAR 2 
S . N .  Buver Se l l • r  B i d  O ffer P r i ce 
1 1 1  
2 4 
3 6 
4 6 
5 
6 
7 6 
B 7 
9 7 
1 0  6 
1 1  6 
1 2  e 
1 l  
1 4  6 
1 5 6 
1 6  
1 7  6 
1 8  
1 9  8 
20 
2 1  6 
22 B 
23 
24 6 
25 
26 8 
27 
28 2 
29 6 
30 
3 1  5 
32  
3 3  B 
3 4  6 
35 6 
36 
37 
38 6 
39 
3 
1 1  
1 2  
l Z.  
2 
t 1  
1 2  
3 
1 1  
1 1  
1 
3 
3 
4 
4 
1 1  
1 1  
4 
2 
4 
l 
l 
4 
130 
1 35 
1 6 5  
1 60 
1 65 
1 65 
1 65 
1 70 
1 6 0  
1 6 0  
1 65 
1 70 
1 70 
1 75 
1 7 5  
1 70 
1 75 
1 8 0  
1 70 
1 75 
1 70 
1 7 0  
1 75 
1 75 
1 80 
1 8 0  
1 75 
1 75 
1 6 5  
1 6 5  
1'5 
1 70 
1 70 
1 70 
1 70 
1 75 
1 75 
1 7 5  
1 7 5  
4 0  8 4 1 7 5  
4 1  8 1 70 
42 8 1 75 
43 8 2 1 75 
4 4  6 1 75 
4 5  6 9 1 75 
46 7 1 75 
47 7 10 1 75 
48 8 1 80 
49 8 1 70 
50 6 1 75 
5 1  5 8 1 8 0  
5 2  6 1 75 
53 8 1 8 5  
54 1 2  1 00 
55 6 9 1 75 
56 8 1 70 
YEAR 3 
S , N ,  Buver Se l l e r  B i d  O f f e r  P r i ce 
1 9 
2 
3 
4 2 
5 1 0  
6 8 
7 8 
0 1 2  
9 6 
1 0  
1 1  7 
1 2  
1 3  
1 4  6 
1 5  6 
1 6  6 
1 7  
1 8  8 
1 9  8 
20 
21 7 
22 
2 3  6 
24 6 
25 
26 B 
27 8 
28 
29 8 
30 1 2  
3 1  
32 1 2  
3 3  6 
34 6 
35 B 
36 B 
37 
38 8 
39 B 
40 
41 0 
42 
43 7 
44 
45 6 
46 
1 5 0  
3 200 
1 1  1 0 0  
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experiment 5 .
1 .  Any buyer (seller) i s  free a t  any time t o  make an oral bid (offer) 
to buy (sell) one unit of the security at a designated price.  
Such bids and offers are publicly announced and recorded . Only 
one (the last) b id and offer are outs tanding at any time . Sellers 
(buyers) are free to accept any public bid (offer) they wish . 
2 .  Even though individuals were trained , we  s till had no way of 
knowing their subj ective probab ilities . 
3 .  Market 1 :  periods 6 ,  8 ;  market 2 :  periods 7 , 9 ;  market 3 :  periods 3 ,  
5,  7 ,  8 ,  10;  market 4 :  periods 5 ,  7 ,  8 ,  10,  1 2 ;  market 5 :  periods 4 ,  
5 ,  1 1 .  
4 .  Buy and Hold :  Buy one certificate at opening price of each period ; 
liquidate at closing price of the pe riod . 
99 
Trend Filter: Observe price trend from opening to current price ; 
if positive , buy 1 f  necessary to holrl one 
certificate ;  if negative , sell if necessary to 
maintain a short position of one certificate . 
Liquidate at closing price . 
y-Franc Fil ter : If price goes up by y or more francs ,  buy if necessary, 
to hold one certificate until the price goes down 
by y or more francs , at which time sell , i f  necessary, 
to maintain a short position of one certificate 
until the price goes up again by y or more francs . 
Liquidate at closing price . 
5 .  Any time current price is below the equilibrium price, hold a 
long position of one certificate by buying at the current price 
if necessary; any time the current price is above the equilibrium 
level, hold a short position of one certificate by selling, i f  
necessary. 
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